Why Do Acquirers Manage Earnings Before Stock-for-Stock Acquisitions? by Tran, Nam D.
  
 
 
WHY DO ACQUIRERS MANAGE EARNINGS BEFORE STOCK-FOR-STOCK 
ACQUISITIONS? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
NAM D. TRAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION 
 
Presented to the Department of Accounting 
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
June 2011 
ii 
 
DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE 
 
Student: Nam D. Tran 
 
Title: Why Do Acquirers Manage Earnings Before Stock-for-Stock Acquisitions? 
 
This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Accounting by: 
 
Steven Matsunaga Chairperson 
Angela Davis Member 
David Guenther Member 
Van Kolpin Outside Member 
 
and 
 
Richard Linton Vice President for Research and Graduate Studies/Dean of 
the Graduate School  
 
Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. 
 
Degree awarded June 2011 
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2011 Nam D. Tran  
iv 
 
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Nam D. Tran 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Accounting 
 
June 2011 
 
Title: Why Do Acquirers Manage Earnings Before Stock-for-Stock Acquisitions? 
Approved:  _______________________________________________ 
Steven Matsunaga 
 
 
In this dissertation, I examine whether high disclosure costs explain why acquirers 
manage earnings before stock-for-stock acquisitions.  Because stock-for-stock acquirers 
use their own shares to pay for targets’ shares, stock-for-stock acquirers have incentives to 
manage earnings in order to boost their stock prices.  I show that high disclosure costs lead 
to an equilibrium in which acquirers engage in earnings management in a manner 
consistent with target firms’ expectations.  As a result, I hypothesize that stock-for-stock 
acquirers with high disclosure costs are more likely to manage earnings before the 
acquisition than stock-for-stock acquirers with low disclosure costs.  
Using a sample of stock-for-stock acquisitions in the United States during the 
period from 1988 to 2009, I find a positive association between acquirers’ proprietary 
disclosure costs and pre-acquisition abnormal accruals.  In addition, I find a negative 
association between pre-acquisition abnormal accruals and abnormal stock returns around 
the acquisition announcement for acquirers with high proprietary disclosure costs but not 
for acquirers with low proprietary disclosure costs.  Assuming that the market is efficient 
with respect to publicly available information, this evidence is also consistent with 
v 
 
acquirers with high proprietary disclosure costs using abnormal accruals to manage 
earnings.  Finally, I do not find a statistically significant association between the extent of 
acquirers’ earnings management and the acquisition premium received by target 
shareholders.  This is consistent with acquirers’ earnings management not serving to extract 
wealth from target shareholders.  Overall, the evidence in this dissertation suggests that 
earnings management by stock-for-stock acquirers is a rational response to targets’ 
expectations when high disclosure costs prevent the acquirers from credibly signaling the 
absence of earnings management. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior research documents that acquirers use discretionary accruals to inflate 
earnings before stock-for-stock acquisitions (Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004; 
Botsari and Meeks 2008).  At first glance, this evidence is consistent with acquirers’ 
incentives to boost stock prices to reduce the cost of the acquisition.  However, given 
target managers’ strong incentives to detect earnings inflation and their ability to request 
additional information from acquiring firms, it is unlikely that target managers would be 
fooled by acquirers’ earnings inflation.1  This raises the question as to why acquirers 
continue to inflate earnings.  One explanation is that acquirers inflate earnings because 
targets expect them to do so.  This could be a rational choice if the acquirers are unable to 
credibly signal the absence of earnings inflation, given that the acquirers’ incentives to 
inflate earnings are obvious to target managers (Stein 1989).  In this dissertation, I 
examine whether costs associated with voluntary disclosures hinder acquirers’ ability to 
signal the absence of earnings inflation, thereby leading to a separating equilibrium in 
which acquirers with high disclosure costs inflate earnings and acquirers with low 
disclosure costs do not inflate earnings prior to stock-for-stock acquisitions. 
In a stock-for-stock acquisition, the acquirer uses its own shares to pay for the 
target’s shares.  Therefore, acquirer managers have ex ante incentives to manage earnings 
upward in order to inflate their share price before the acquisition.  However, target 
managers should be able to anticipate the acquirer’s incentives and request additional 
information from the acquirer during the due diligence process to verify whether the 
                                                           
1
 In this paper, the term “earnings inflation” refers to upward earnings management. 
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acquirer’s earnings are inflated.  As earnings management is costly (Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney 1996; Gong, Louis, and Sun 2008), acquirer managers have incentives to 
provide the requested information to signal the absence of earnings management and 
avoid managing earnings.  However, there are costs associated with disclosing the 
requested information to target managers.  First, information necessary to verify the 
absence of earnings management might be proprietary in nature and revelation of such 
information could undermine the acquirer’s competitive position.  For example, verifying 
the absence of earnings management requires access to information about the acquirer’s 
transactions with key customers and suppliers, expected future sales, plans to introduce 
new products, profitability by product or by geographic market, and investment 
opportunities.  Second, due to the inherent complexity of their operation, it might be 
practically infeasible for some acquirers to provide sufficient information to convince 
target managers that earnings management does not occur.  For example, firms with 
multiple business segments and firms with highly volatile earnings might find it difficult 
to provide sufficient information to signal the absence of earnings management.   
If the cost of disclosing information to signal the absence of earnings management 
is high relative to the cost of managing earnings, an optimal strategy for the acquirer 
would be to withhold the information and forgo the opportunity to signal the absence of 
earnings management (Verrecchia 1983; Wagenhofer 2000; Hansen 2001).  In this case, 
target managers, who understand the acquirer’s incentives to bias earnings upward and 
are unable to verify the absence of earnings inflation, would rationally assume that the 
acquirer has inflated earnings and discount the acquirer’s share value accordingly in 
3 
 
setting the exchange ratio.2  Anticipating target managers’ behavior, acquiring firms with 
high disclosure costs rationally use discretionary accruals to inflate earnings in 
accordance with target managers’ expectation (Stein 1989).  On the other hand, acquiring 
firms with low disclosure costs find it optimal to disclose information to signal the 
absence of earnings inflation and not to inflate earnings.3 
The existence of a separating equilibrium, in which only stock-for-stock acquirers 
with disclosure costs that exceed the cost of earnings management would inflate earnings, 
leads to two empirical predictions.  First, holding the cost of earnings management 
constant, there is a positive association between stock-for-stock acquirers’ pre-acquisition 
abnormal accruals and disclosure costs.4  Second, there is a negative association between 
pre-acquisition abnormal accruals and abnormal stock returns around the acquisition 
announcement for stock-for-stock acquirers with high disclosure costs but not for stock-
for-stock acquirers with low disclosure costs.  The second prediction should hold because 
when the acquisition is announced, the market recognizes stock-for-stock acquirers’ 
incentives to inflate earnings and adjusts their stock prices downward for the assumed 
amount of earnings inflation, resulting in a negative association between acquirers’ pre-
acquisition abnormal accruals and abnormal stock returns around the acquisition 
announcement (Louis 2004).  Since in equilibrium acquirers with high disclosure costs 
                                                           
2
 Exchange ratio is the number of the acquirer’s shares to be exchanged for one target’s share. 
 
3
 A maintained assumption underlying this prediction is that an acquirer cannot simultaneously disclose 
information and manage earnings because their earnings management will be exposed by their disclosures.  
This assumption is consistent with the empirical evidence that firms that have more transparent disclosures 
are less likely to manage earnings around their seasoned equity offerings (Jo and Kim 2007). 
 
4
 In this dissertation, abnormal accruals and discretionary accruals are used interchangeably to indicate the 
extent of earnings management. 
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inflate earnings and acquirers with low disclosure costs do not, I expect this negative 
association to only hold for acquirers with high disclosure costs. 
I test my hypotheses using a sample of stock-for-stock acquisitions in the United 
States during the period from 1988 to 2009.  I use abnormal current accruals to proxy for 
the extent of acquirers’ earnings inflation.  Abnormal current accruals are estimated using 
the performance-adjusted approach in Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005).  Following 
prior studies, I use acquirers’ industry concentration, price-cost margin, and market-to-
book ratio as proxies for costs associated with disclosing proprietary information 
(Bamber and Cheon 1998; Harris 1998; Nevo 2001; Botosan and Stanford 2005; Karuna 
2007).  To proxy for the difficulty faced by acquirers in providing sufficient information 
to signal the absence of earnings management (i.e., disclosure complexity), I use 
acquirers’ number of business segments and earnings volatility.  Acquirers with more 
business segments or more volatile earnings are assumed to have higher disclosure costs. 
Consistent with prior research (Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004; Botsari and 
Meeks 2008), I find that, on average, stock-for-stock acquirers have positive and 
statistically significant abnormal accruals in the three quarters immediately before the 
acquisition announcement.  Consistent with my first hypothesis, I find a positive and 
statistically significant association between stock-for-stock acquirers’ pre-acquisition 
abnormal accruals and three proxies for proprietary disclosure costs (i.e., industry 
concentration, price-cost margin, and market-to-book ratio), after controlling for other 
factors known to affect firms’ propensity to manage earnings.  However, I do not find a 
positive and statistically significant association between acquirers’ pre-acquisition 
abnormal accruals and two proxies for disclosure complexity (i.e., earnings volatility and 
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number of business segments).  Consistent with my second hypothesis, I find a negative 
and statistically significant association between pre-acquisition abnormal accruals and 
abnormal stock returns around the acquisition announcement for stock-for-stock 
acquirers with high proprietary disclosure costs but not for stock-for-stock acquirers with 
low proprietary disclosure costs.  Finally, similar to the results for the first hypothesis, I 
do not find evidence consistent with the second hypothesis when I use acquirers’ earnings 
volatility and number of business segments as proxies for disclosure costs. 
I conduct several additional tests to increase confidence that the above findings 
are consistent with high proprietary disclosure costs inducing acquirers’ earnings 
management.  First, I examine whether acquirers’ earnings inflation reduces the amount 
of acquisition premium received by target shareholders.  Following Schwert (1996), I 
calculate the acquisition premium as the cumulative abnormal return to the target’s stock 
from the 42nd trading day prior to the acquisition announcement through the 126th trading 
day after the acquisition announcement (or through delisting, whichever comes first).  
Consistent with acquirers’ earnings inflation not serving to extract wealth from target 
shareholders, I do not find a statistically significant association between acquirers’ pre-
acquisition abnormal accruals and acquisition premium.  Second, I test whether the 
association between proprietary disclosure costs and pre-acquisition abnormal accruals 
holds for cash acquirers.  Unlike stock-for-stock acquirers, cash acquirers pay their 
targets with cash and hence have no acquisition-induced incentive to inflate earnings.  
Therefore, I do not expect the association between proprietary disclosure costs and pre-
acquisition abnormal accruals to hold for cash acquirers.  Consistent with this prediction, 
the association between cash acquirers’ proprietary disclosure costs and pre-acquisition 
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abnormal accruals is not statistically significant at conventional levels.  In addition, 
neither cash acquirers with high disclosure costs nor cash acquirers with low disclosure 
costs have significantly positive abnormal accruals over the three quarters immediately 
before the acquisition announcement.  Finally, I use the approach developed by Pungaliya 
and Vijh (2009) to adjust for both ROA and sales growth in estimating abnormal accruals 
for acquirers.  Inferences are unchanged if I use this alternative measure of abnormal 
accruals as a proxy for earnings management to test my hypotheses. 
This study makes several contributions to the literature.  First, it offers an 
explanation for why acquirers inflate earnings before stock-for-stock acquisitions.  
Specifically, costs associated with disclosing proprietary information hinder acquirers’ 
ability to signal the absence of earnings inflation, leading acquirers with high disclosure 
costs to inflate earnings.  In a recent study, Pungaliya and Vijh (2009) question evidence 
of earnings management by stock-for-stock acquirers documented in prior literature by 
arguing that for acquirers to benefit from earnings management, it is necessary that target 
managers are either misled or not acting in the interest of target shareholders.  My 
findings suggest that earnings management could occur even when target managers are 
rational and acting in the interest of their shareholders.  More generally, the results in this 
paper imply that high disclosure costs could lead to earnings management in settings 
where managers are unable to mislead financial statement users.  For example, 
Shivakumar (2000) finds that firms manage earnings before seasoned equity offerings 
even though investors understand their motives and fully adjust for earnings management 
when the offerings are announced.  Coles, Hertzel, and Kalpathy (2006) find that prior to 
firms’ reissuances of executive stock options, managers use discretionary accruals to 
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manage earnings downward even though investors and financial analysts properly 
anticipate and adjust for their earnings management.   
Second, this study adds to the literature that examines the link between disclosure 
costs and managers’ financial reporting choices.  Prior studies have documented that 
firms with higher proprietary disclosure costs are less willing to provide voluntary 
disclosures because of concerns about revealing proprietary information that may 
undermine their competitive position (Bamber and Cheon 1998; Harris 1998; Botosan 
and Stanford 2005).  The evidence in this study suggests that concerns about disclosing 
proprietary information may also lead firms to manipulate earnings because they are 
unable to credibly signal to financial statement users that their earnings are free from 
manipulation. 
Finally, while prior research finds that stock-for-stock acquirers manage earnings 
prior to the acquisition, it is not clear whether acquirers successfully extract wealth from 
target shareholders.  In this study, I do not find evidence that acquirers’ earnings 
management affects the amount of acquisition premium received by target shareholders, 
suggesting that target managers properly anticipate and adjust for acquirers’ earnings 
management to protect target shareholders. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter II provides a 
review of the related literature.  Hypotheses are developed in Chapter III.  Chapter IV 
describes the data and research design.  Empirical results are presented in Chapter V.  
Chapter VI presents additional tests.  Finally, summary and concluding remarks are 
provided in Chapter VII. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Earnings Management by Stock-for-Stock Acquirers 
In a stock-for-stock acquisition, the acquirer uses its own shares to pay for the 
target’s shares.  The exchange ratio, defined as the number of the acquirer’s shares in 
exchange for one target’s share, is usually determined based on market prices of the 
acquirer’s and the target’s shares shortly before the acquisition announcement when these 
prices are available.5 Holding the target’s stock price constant, the higher the acquirer’ 
stock price shortly before the acquisition agreement, the lower the exchange ratio will be.  
This implies that stock-for-stock acquirers have ex ante incentives to boost their stock 
prices shortly before the acquisition agreement.  If earnings management allows acquirers 
to artificially inflate their stock prices in the short term, then one would expect that stock-
for-stock acquirers have ex ante incentives to manage earnings upward in periods leading 
to the acquisition agreement.  Prior studies have found empirical evidence consistent with 
this conjecture.  Erickson and Wang (1999) examine a sample of 55 stock-for-stock 
acquisitions during the period 1985-1990 and find that stock-for-stock acquirers have 
abnormally high discretionary accruals in the three fiscal quarters immediately before the 
acquisition announcement.6  They also find that acquirers’ pre-acquisition abnormal 
                                                           
5
 In acquisition announcements, acquirers/targets and their financial advisors frequently express opinion 
about the fairness of the exchange ratio by reference to stock prices shortly before the acquisition 
announcement date. 
 
6
 Erickson and Wang (1999) find that target firms have positive but statistically insignificant discretionary 
accruals before the acquisition announcement despite the fact that targets should also have incentives to 
boost their stock prices (Baik, Kang, and Morton [2007] find similar evidence). The authors suggest that 
acquirers are in a better position to identify their target and time the transaction.  In contrast, it is usually 
too late for a target firm to manage earnings by the time the acquirer initiates the deal.  While in principle 
an acquisition can be initiated by the target firm, in reality most deals are initiated by the acquirer (e.g., 
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accruals are higher when the target is larger relative to the acquirer, consistent with 
acquirers managing earnings more when the economic benefits from earnings 
management are higher.  Louis (2004) examines a sample of 236 stock-for-stock 
acquirers during the period 1992-2000 and finds similar evidence, except that acquirers in 
Louis (2004) only exhibit positive and statistically significant abnormal accruals in the 
latest quarter preceding the acquisition announcement.  Finally, Botsari and Meeks 
(2008) examine a sample of 42 stock-for-stock acquirers in the United Kingdom during 
the period 1997-2001 and find that stock-for-stock acquirers have abnormally high 
discretionary accruals in the fiscal year immediately before the acquisition 
announcement.  
While existing evidence consistently suggests that stock-for-stock acquirers 
inflate earnings before the acquisition, consistent with their incentives to boost stock 
prices, the role played by target managers has been ignored.7  Target managers should 
have strong incentives to detect and adjust for the impact of earnings management on the 
acquirer’s stock price.  First, target managers have fiduciary duties to protect their 
shareholders.  Second, target managers have equity ownership in the target firm and 
hence would act to protect their own interests.8  Finally, allowing earnings management 
to transfer wealth from target shareholders to acquiring shareholders would likely 
damage the reputation of target managers. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Anilowski, Macias, and Sanchez [2009] find that in their sample of 279 negotiation acquisitions, only 25% 
of the deals are initiated by the target firm). 
 
7
 In this dissertation, “target managers” refer to the target management team in charge of negotiating the 
acquisition, which may or may not include the target CEO (Heitzman 2009). 
 
8
 Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) find that the largest source of wealth increase for CEOs of target 
firms in mergers and acquisitions comes from appreciation of the their direct stockholdings in the target 
firms. 
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In a typical acquisition, both the acquirer and the target conduct due diligence.  
While the depth of the due diligence process varies, at the minimum both parties should 
focus on three areas: financial statements review, legal compliance review, and 
management and operations review (Lajoux and Elson 2000).  While it might seem 
intuitive that due diligence should be of greater concern to acquiring firms, target firms 
are advised to pay special attention to the due diligence process when target shareholders 
are paid with the acquirer’s shares instead of cash.9  In conducting financial due 
diligence, target managers are assisted by their own accountants as well as professional 
financial advisors.  Given target managers’ incentives, expertise, and their access to 
additional information from the acquirer during the due diligence process, it is reasonable 
to assume that target managers would not be fooled by the acquirer’s earnings 
management.  Thus, existing evidence suggests a puzzle whereby acquirers inflate 
earnings prior to stock-for-stock acquisitions even though target managers should be able 
to anticipate and adjust for the earnings inflation.10 
 
 
                                                           
9
 “[J]ust as a buyer can be sued for paying too much money for an acquisition, a seller can be sued for 
accepting too little money.” (Lajoux and Elson 2000, p.10) 
 
10
 One could argue that although target managers are not fooled, they might not adjust for the acquirer’s 
earnings inflation because they receive some personal benefits from the acquirer.  Existing evidence as to 
whether target managers accept “sweetheart deals” at the expense of target shareholders are mixed.  
Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) find a weakly negative association between merger premium and 
target CEOs’ special treatments offered by acquiring firms.  On the other hand, Bargeron, Schlingemann, 
Stulz, and Zutter (2010) find that acquirers’ decision to retain target managers in the merged firm is 
primarily driven by performance related reasons (e.g., when the target CEO has specialized expertise, when 
the target has good past performance, and when the target insider ownership is high).  Moreover, Baik et al. 
(2007) find stronger evidence of earnings management by acquirers when the target is a private firm, where 
the interests of target shareholders and managers are presumably aligned.  Finally, Heitzman (2009) finds 
that target directors increase equity grants to target CEOs who negotiate the acquisition to align their 
interest with that of shareholders, which reduces the likelihood that target managers collude with the 
acquirer at the expense of target shareholders. 
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Disclosure Costs and Earnings Management by Stock-for-Stock Acquirers 
One possible explanation for the aforementioned puzzle is that earnings inflation 
by stock-for-stock acquirers does not serve to extract wealth from target shareholders but 
rather is a rational response to targets’ expectations when the acquirers are unable to 
credibly signal the absence of earnings inflation.  This is the signal-jamming hypothesis 
offered by Stein (1989).11  Since target managers know that the acquirer has ex ante 
incentives to inflate earnings, if the acquirer is unable to credibly signal the absence of 
earnings inflation, target managers would rationally assume that earnings inflation occurs 
and adjust the acquirer’s reported earnings for the assumed amount of inflation in valuing 
the acquirer’s shares.  In this case, the acquirer’s best response is to inflate earnings in a 
manner consistent with target managers’ expectations.  This analysis implies that high 
costs of signaling the absence of earnings inflation might lead acquirers to inflate 
earnings even though they are unable to fool target managers. 
Early work in economics suggests that it is in the interest of sellers to fully reveal 
to buyers their private information about the quality of the asset that they are selling.  The 
reason is that rational buyers would interpret withheld information as unfavorable and 
discount the asset’s value to the point where all sellers of assets with quality higher than 
the worst one would find it desirable to reveal the quality of their asset (Grossman and 
Hart 1980; Grossman 1981; Milgrom 1981).  Extending this idea to the realm of financial 
disclosures, one implication is that if managers’ objective is to maximize the market 
value of their firm, they should fully disclose their private information to the market.  
However, we rarely observe full disclosures in reality.  One explanation for partial 
                                                           
11
 Stein (1989) does not specifically examine stock-for-stock acquisitions.  His signal-jamming model is 
developed to explain why managers manage earnings in more general settings. 
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disclosures is that there are costs associated with disclosing private information.  When 
disclosures are costly, there exist equilibria in which not all information is disclosed even 
if the market is rational and presumes that withheld information is unfavorable (see for 
examples, Verrecchia 1983; Hayes and Lundholm 1996).  While there are various costs 
associated with disclosing private information, the most compelling example are perhaps 
costs associated with revealing proprietary information, which might be used by 
competitors to the disadvantage of the disclosing firm (Verrecchia 2001, p. 141). 
Consistent with this theoretical work, empirical studies have found evidence that 
costs associated with disclosing proprietary information deter firms’ voluntary 
disclosures.  For example, Harris (1998) and Botosan and Stanford (2005) find that firms 
withhold information about operations in industries characterized by high degrees of 
concentration or industries in which firms’ abnormal profitability persists over time, 
consistent with concerns about revealing proprietary information discouraging 
transparent segment disclosures.  Bamber and Cheon (1998) find that firms with more 
growth opportunities and firms that operate in more concentrated industries are less likely 
to issue earnings forecasts unless there is pressure from financial analysts.  Moreover, 
firms with more growth opportunities and firms that operate in more concentrated 
industries tend to issue less specific forecasts, presumably because of concerns about 
revealing proprietary information.  Finally, Dedman and Lennox (2009) survey managers 
of private firms in the UK and find that managers are more likely to withhold information 
about sales and cost of sales when they perceive that the degree of competition in their 
product market is high. 
13 
 
In the context of a stock-for-stock acquisition, target managers have strong 
incentives to remove any impact of earnings inflation on the acquirer’s stock price to 
ensure that target shareholders are not underpaid for their firm.  During the due diligence 
process, target managers can request information from the acquirer to verify whether the 
acquirer’s earnings are biased.  As earnings management is costly (Dechow et al. 1996; 
Gong et al. 2008), acquirer managers have incentives to signal the absence of earnings 
management and avoid managing earnings.  However, in deciding whether to provide the 
requested information, acquirer managers also take into account costs associated with 
disclosing private information.  First, some of the information necessary to identify “true” 
earnings can be proprietary in nature and revelation of such information is detrimental to 
the acquirer’s competitive position.  For example, information about transactions with 
key customers and suppliers, expected future sales, product development and introduction 
plans, or profitability by geographic market is necessary to verify the unbiasedness of 
earnings, but disclosing such information might be very costly to the acquirer.12, 13 
Second, due to the inherent complexity of their operation, it might be practically 
infeasible for some acquirers to provide sufficient information to convince target 
managers that the acquirers’ earnings are unbiased.   
                                                           
12
 Dontoh (1989) presents a model in which competitors adjust their production schedule in response to 
firms’ disclosures of future outcomes (e.g., earnings forecasts).  More timely and accurate disclosures about 
future outcomes allow competitors to more efficiently adjust their production schedule and gain 
competitive advantages over the disclosing firms.  Hayes and Lundholm (1996) model how competitors 
adjust their capital allocation in response to firms’ disclosures of segment activities.  More accurate 
disclosures of segment activities allow competitors to make more efficient capital allocation decisions at 
the expense of the disclosing firms. 
 
13
 One might argue that because of the private nature of the information exchange through due diligence, 
the acquirer should not be concerned about proprietary disclosure costs.  This argument may be reasonable 
if the acquirer is certain that the deal will go through, however, if the acquirer is uncertain, the acquirer 
would be concerned about disclosing proprietary information, especially when the target is an existing 
competitor of the acquirer, a potential entrant to the acquirer’s market, or when there are multiple bidders 
and some of them are existing competitors of the acquirer.  Boone and Mulherin (2007) find that for an 
average deal, there are nine bidders contacting or being contacted by one target. 
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Assuming that the objective of acquirer managers is to maximize their firm value, 
they would trade off the cost of managing earnings against the cost of disclosing private 
information to signal the absence of earnings management.  If the cost of disclosing 
information is low relative to the cost of managing earnings, acquirer managers would 
choose to disclose information to signal the absence of earnings management and avoid 
managing earnings.  In contrast, if the cost of disclosing information is high relative to 
the cost of managing earnings, acquirer managers would choose to withhold information 
and forgo the opportunity to signal the absence of earnings management (Verrecchia 
1983; Wagenhofer 2000; Hansen 2001).  Being unable to verify the absence of earnings 
management, target managers would rationally assume that earnings management occurs 
and discount the acquirer’s stock price for the assumed impact of earnings inflation.  
Given target managers’ strategy, the acquirer’s best response in this case is to inflate 
earnings in accordance with target managers’ conjecture.14  In sum, differential costs of 
disclosure lead to a separating equilibrium in which acquirers with high disclosure costs 
inflate earnings and acquirers with low disclosure costs do not inflate earnings prior to 
the acquisition.15 In the next section, I will develop hypotheses to test whether disclosure 
costs are associated with the propensity of stock-for-stock acquirers to manage earnings 
before the acquisition. 
                                                           
14
 Admittedly, acquirers might have other devices to signal the absence of earnings management.  For 
example, insider share purchases can signal that the company’s shares are not overvalued due to earnings 
inflation.  To the extent that acquirers can use devices other than disclosures to signal the absence of 
earnings management, the role of disclosure costs becomes less important and I would be less likely to find 
evidence consistent with my hypotheses. 
 
15
 See Appendix A for a formal illustration of an earnings management game with a separating equilibrium.  
This analysis is consistent with Hansen (2001), who presents a model of company auction in which the 
seller deliberately withholds information whose revelation might impose costs and reduce the firm value.  
Similarly, Wagenhofer (2000) analyzes acquisitions in which the buyer and seller are competitors and 
shows that uncertainty about the intention of the buyer (i.e., whether the buyer will actually buy or not) will 
deter disclosures of verifiable information by the seller.  Although these studies focus on sellers’ disclosure 
decisions, the same logic applies to buyers’ disclosure strategies.  
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Acquirers’ Disclosure Costs and Pre-acquisition Abnormal Accruals 
The analyses in the previous section suggest that stock-for-stock acquirers with 
high disclosure costs are more likely to manage earnings before the acquisition than 
stock-for-stock acquirers with low disclosure costs.  Following prior studies (Botsari and 
Meeks 2008; Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004), I use abnormal accruals as a proxy 
for earnings management.  I then examine the association between acquirers’ disclosure 
costs and abnormal accruals over the quarters leading to the acquisition announcement.  
If stock-for-stock acquirers with high disclosure costs are more likely to manage earnings 
before the acquisition than stock-for-stock acquirers with low disclosure costs, then we 
would expect a positive association between acquirers’ disclosure costs and pre-
acquisition abnormal accruals.  Therefore, my first hypothesis is: 
H1: There is a positive association between stock-for-stock acquirers’ disclosure 
costs and pre-acquisition abnormal accruals. 
One might argue that using abnormal accruals to identify earnings management is 
problematic because accruals are publicly observable.  That is, if target managers can 
detect earnings inflation by looking at abnormal accruals, acquirers would be able to 
signal the absence of earnings inflation through their accrual choices and hence do not 
have to inflate earnings.  To see why the earnings inflation equilibrium still sustains even 
if target managers can observe acquirers’ abnormal accruals, it is important to understand 
why the equilibrium exists in the first place.  Since abnormal accruals are an imperfect 
measure of earnings management, target managers need access to additional private 
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information from the acquirer to correctly identify whether earnings management occurs.  
Target managers would infer earnings management occurs if the acquirer refuses to 
provide such information, regardless of the observed accruals.  Anticipating target 
managers’ strategy, acquirers that choose to withhold information (due to high disclosure 
costs) would rationally use abnormal accruals to inflate earnings.  This implies that, on 
average, acquirers that inflate earnings should have higher abnormal accruals than 
acquirers that do not inflate earnings.  Therefore, researchers can still rely on abnormal 
accruals to separate acquirers that manage earnings from acquirers that do not, as 
abnormal accruals are positively correlated with the extent of earnings management.16 
Acquirers’ Pre-acquisition Abnormal Accruals and Stock Returns Around 
Acquisition Announcements 
This section develops a hypothesis about the association between stock-for-stock 
acquirers’ pre-acquisition abnormal accruals and abnormal stock returns around the 
acquisition announcement.  Since the market is not aware of the acquisition until it is 
announced, the market underestimates stock-for-stock acquirers’ incentives to inflate 
earnings and hence underestimates the equilibrium level of earnings inflation, resulting in 
an overvaluation of stock-for-stock acquirers’ shares before the acquisition 
announcement.  Once the acquisition is announced, the market recognizes the acquirers’ 
incentives to inflate earnings and adjusts their stock prices for the assumed amount of 
earnings inflation.  This leads to a negative association between stock-for-stock 
                                                           
16
 Recent studies find an increasing trend of firms to use real earnings management as a substitute to 
accruals management after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2008; 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005; Jiang, Petroni, and Wang 2008).  To the extent that stock-for-stock 
acquirers alter real activities to manage earnings, using abnormal accruals to measure earnings management 
works against finding evidence supporting my hypotheses.  
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acquirers’ pre-acquisition abnormal accruals and abnormal stock returns around the 
acquisition announcement (Louis 2004).  Since in equilibrium only acquirers with high 
disclosure costs inflate earnings while acquirers with low disclosure costs do not, I expect 
the negative association between pre-acquisition abnormal accruals and abnormal stock 
returns around the acquisition announcement to only hold for acquirers with high 
disclosure costs.  This leads to my second hypothesis: 
H2: There is a negative association between pre-acquisition abnormal accruals 
and abnormal stock returns around the acquisition announcement for stock-for-
stock acquirers with high disclosure costs but not for stock-for-stock acquirers 
with low disclosure costs. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA DESCRIPTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample Description 
My initial sample includes all mergers and acquisitions from the SDC Platinum 
database that meet the following criteria.  (1) The deal is announced during the period 
from January 1988 to December 2009.17  (2) Both the target and the acquirer are US 
firms.  (3) The acquirer is a non-financial firm.  (4) The acquirer is a public firm at the 
time of the acquisition.  (5) The form of the deal is either merger or acquisition.  (6) The 
deal value is available in the SDC Platinum database.  (7) The deal is completed.  (8) The 
consideration structure is pure stock.  (9) The acquirer owns less than 50% of the target’s 
shares before the acquisition. (10) The acquirer owns at least 51% of the target’s shares 
after the acquisition.  These data requirements are common in prior literature (Louis 
2004; Baik et al. 2007; Raman, Shivakumar, and Tamayo 2008). 
Applying these criteria results in an initial sample of 3,176 acquisitions.  For 
acquirers that undertake multiple acquisitions, I drop deals that are preceded by another 
deal (regardless of payment consideration) completed within the previous eight quarters.  
This procedure is intended to reduce noise in measuring abnormal accruals for quarters 
that fall between two consecutive acquisitions (Hribar and Collins 2002).  Requiring data 
from Compustat to calculate variables included in model (2) below reduces the sample to 
890 stock-for-stock deals.  Samples used in individual tests might be smaller due to more 
stringent data requirements.  Table 1 outlines the sample selection process. 
                                                           
17
 The sample period begins in 1988 as historical SIC codes (SICH) are available in Compustat since 1987.  
Historical SIC codes are required to calculate industry concentration, industry adjusted price-cost margin 
and abnormal accruals, three key variables in this study. 
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
Description     Obs 
All stock-for-stock acquisitions from the SDC Platinum database that meet 
preliminary sample selection criteria 
3,176 
Drop deals that are preceded by another deal (regardless of payment consideration) 
completed within the previous eight quarters 
(706) 
Drop deals without sufficient data from Compustat to calculate variables included in 
model (2) 
(1,565) 
Drop acquirers with extreme abnormal accruals (top and bottom 0.5%) (15) 
Primary Sample  890 
 
 
Variable Measurement 
Performance Adjusted Abnormal Accruals 
I use performance adjusted abnormal accruals as a proxy for earnings 
management.  Performance adjusted abnormal accruals are estimated using the method in 
Kothari et al. (2005).18  I first estimate model (1) below for each industry-year during my 
sample period using all available observations from Compustat (industries are defined in 
terms of the two-digit SIC assigned by Compustat, industry-years with less than 20 
observations are excluded). 
CAit = λ0 + ∑ 	  + λ5(∆SALEit - ∆ARit) + µ it  (1) 
                                                           
18
 A disadvantage of using aggregate abnormal accruals is that I am unable to determine exactly how 
acquirers manage earnings.  However, since the objective is to examine whether earnings management 
occurs, using aggregate abnormal accruals might be more efficient than examining individual accounts 
because managers are likely to manipulate multiple accounts to make their earnings management less 
obvious.  For example, in a recent roundtable hosted by the Financial Accounting Standards Research 
Initiative (FASRI), Aaron Beam (founding CFO of HealthSouth Corporation) revealed that before the 
HealthSouth accounting fraud was exposed in 2003, the company was using over 120,000 journal entries 
every quarter to spread their earnings manipulation all over the balance sheet. The archived copy of the 
roundtable can be found at: http://fasri.net/index.php/2010/02/aaron-beam-weston-smith/ 
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CAit is the current accruals of firm i in quarter t, which equals the change in 
current assets (excluding the change in cash) minus the change in current liabilities 
(excluding the change in short-term debt).  Qnit is a dummy variable equal to 1 for fiscal 
quarter n (n=1,…, 4), 0 otherwise.  ∆SALEit is the change in sales of firm i from quarter t-
1 to quarter t.  ∆ARit is the change in accounts receivable of firm i in quarter t.  All 
variables, including the quarter dummies, are scaled by lagged total assets.  Following 
Louis (2004), all variables in model (1) are truncated at -1 and 1.  Then, for each 
industry-quarter, I construct ROA quintiles based on firms’ ROA for the same quarter in 
the previous year, and calculate the median residual from model (1) for each ROA 
quintile.  I require each quintile to have at least 3 observations.  Finally, the performance 
adjusted abnormal accruals is calculated as the difference between the residual from 
model (1) of each sample firm and the median residual of the ROA quintile that the firm 
belongs to.   
Disclosure Costs 
Measuring disclosure costs has always been a difficult task in the accounting 
literature.  In this dissertation, I use five proxies for disclosure costs.  Three proxies 
(acquirers’ industry concentration, price-cost margin, and market-to-book ratio) are 
intended to capture costs associated with disclosing proprietary information to 
competitors and two proxies (acquirers’ earnings volatility and number of business 
segments) are intended to capture the difficulty faced by acquirers in providing sufficient 
information to signal the absence of earnings management.   
I assume that concerns about proprietary disclosure costs are higher when the firm 
faces stronger competitive pressures in its product market.  Given this assumption, I use 
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acquirers’ industry concentration and price-cost margin as two proxies for disclosure 
costs.  Industry concentration has been widely used in the accounting literature to proxy 
for disclosure costs (Bamber and Cheon 1998; Harris 1998; Botosan and Stanford 2005).  
The intuition is that in highly concentrated industries, firms’ disclosures are more likely 
to affect their competitors’ actions.  Moreover, large firms operating in concentrated 
industries likely have acquired some strategic advantages (Liebeler 1978), which makes it 
more dangerous for other firms to disclose proprietary information in such environment.19  
I calculate industry concentration as the ratio of total annual sales by four firms with the 
highest sales in each industry over total annual sales of all firms in that industry (the four-
firm concentration ratio).  Industries are defined in terms of the two-digit SIC assigned by 
Compustat.  Industry concentration is measured for the year immediately before the 
acquisition announcement. 
Price-cost margin has been a traditional measure of firms’ market power in the 
Industrial Organization literature (e.g., Lerner 1934; Landes and Posner 1981; Nevo 
2001) and accounting literature (Karuna 2007).  I assume that firms with high market 
power face less competitive pressure and hence are likely less concerned about 
proprietary disclosure costs.  Therefore, I use acquirers’ price-cost margin as a second 
                                                           
19
 It is important to note that while prior studies predict a negative association between firms’ industry 
concentration and voluntary disclosures, the underlying reasons for that prediction are not consistent.  For 
example, Botosan and Stanford (2005) assume that firms in highly concentrated industries face less 
competition, which allows them to earn higher profit (the collusion hypothesis).  Therefore, firms in 
concentrated industries have incentives to withhold information to deter entry.  In contrast, Bamber and 
Cheon (1998) rely on Liebeler’s (1978) argument that industries become highly concentrated because some 
firms have acquired superior competitive advantages, and it is more dangerous to disclose proprietary 
information in such industries (the competitive advantages hypothesis).  Both the collusion hypothesis and 
the competitive advantages hypothesis are offered to explain the positive association between industry 
concentration and profit rates (e.g., Bain 1951).  However, studies subsequent to Bain (1951) have 
questioned both the existence and persistence of such association (see Liebeler [1978] for a review).  More 
importantly, Liebeler (1978) argues that even if such association exists, the competitive advantages 
hypothesis is superior to the collusion hypothesis since only the former can explain why entry and 
expansion do not occur in response to high profit rates. 
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proxy for disclosure costs, with high price-cost margin implying low disclosure costs.  
Specifically, I calculate the average price-cost margin for each acquirer over the three 
years immediately before the acquisition announcement.  To control for differences in 
production technologies across industries, I adjust each acquirer’s average price-cost 
margin by subtracting from it the median average price-cost margin of the acquirer’s 
industry over the same three-year period (industries are defined in terms of the two-digit 
SIC assigned by Compustat).  Following Karuna (2007), price-cost margin is calculated 
as sales divided by operating costs.  Operating costs include cost of goods sold, selling, 
general and administrative (SG&A) expenses, and depreciation and amortization 
expenses. 
My third proxy for proprietary disclosure costs is acquirers’ market-to-book ratio.  
Firms with high market-to-book ratio likely have valuable growth opportunities, which 
might dissipate if information about those opportunities is revealed to competitors.  Thus, 
acquirers with high market-to-book ratio are expected to have high proprietary disclosure 
costs (Bamber and Cheon 1998).  I calculate market-to-book ratio as the market value 
divided by the book value of acquirers’ equity at the end of the fourth fiscal quarter prior 
to the acquisition announcement. 
Another source of disclosure costs comes from the difficulty in identifying and 
providing sufficient information for target managers to verify the absence of earnings 
management (i.e., disclosure complexity).  Even if acquirers are not concerned about 
proprietary disclosure costs, the inherent complexity of their operation might make it 
practically impossible for some acquirers to provide sufficient information to convince 
target managers that the acquirers’ earnings are not manipulated.  This is likely to be the 
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case for acquirers operating in multiple business segments or acquirers that have highly 
volatile earnings.  Therefore, I use acquirers’ number of business segments and earnings 
volatility as two additional proxies for disclosure costs.  Firms with more business 
segments or more volatile earnings are assumed to have higher disclosure costs.  
Acquirers’ number of business segments is obtained from the Compustat Segments Files.  
Acquirers’ earnings volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of quarterly net 
income scaled by lagged total assets over eight quarters up to the fourth quarter before 
the acquisition announcement. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Test of Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive association between acquirers’ pre-acquisition 
abnormal accruals and disclosure costs.  This hypothesis is tested by estimating the 
following OLS model: 
Cum_AAi = θ1 + θ2Disc_Costi + θ3Sizei + θ4Pooli + θ5Leveragei + θ6Litigationi  
       + θ7Same_Industryi + θ8Private_Targeti + θ9Post_SOXi  + εi            (2) 
Cum_AAi is the cumulative performance adjusted abnormal accruals of acquirer i 
over the three quarters immediately before the acquisition announcement.  The 
accumulation of abnormal accruals over those three quarters is motivated by the evidence 
in this paper and in prior studies that acquirers appear to inflate earnings over the three 
quarters immediately before the acquisition announcement (Erickson and Wang 1999; 
Baik et al. 2007).  Disc_Costi is one of the five proxies: acquirer’s industry concentration, 
price-cost margin, market-to-book ratio, number of business segments, and earnings 
volatility.  Hypothesis 1 predicts that θ2 < 0 when price-cost margin is used as a proxy for 
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disclosure costs and θ2 > 0 when the other four measures are used as a proxy for 
disclosure costs. 
I control for several factors that potentially influence acquiring firms’ propensity 
to manage earnings other than the acquisition itself.  Sizei is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of acquirer i’s equity at the end of the fourth fiscal quarter prior to the 
acquisition announcement.  Firm size is included to control for acquirers’ incentives to 
manage earnings downward to reduce political costs (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).  
Pooli is a dummy variable equal to 1 if acquirer i uses the pooling-of-interest method in 
accounting for the acquisition, 0 otherwise.  Firms that choose to use the pooling-of-
interest method are usually more concerned about reporting favorable earnings than firms 
that use the purchase method (Aboody, Kasznik, and Williams 2000; Ayers, Lefanowicz, 
and Robinson 2002).  Therefore, I expect acquirers that use the pooling-of-interest 
method to have higher abnormal accruals than acquirers that use the purchase method.  
Leveragei equals long-term debt divided by total assets of acquirer i at the end of the 
fourth fiscal quarter prior to the acquisition announcement.  I control for leverage since 
firms with high leverage are likely concerned about debt covenant violation, which might 
induce earnings management.  Litigationi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if acquirer i 
belongs to a high-litigation risk industry, 0 otherwise.  High-litigation risk industries are 
defined based on Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994) and include biotechnology (SIC 
codes 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computers (SIC codes 3570-3577 and 7370-7374), 
electronics (SIC codes 3600-3674), and retailing (SIC codes 5200-5961).  Same_Industryi 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if both the acquirer and its target are in the same industry, 
0 otherwise (industries are defined based on the two-digit SIC assigned by SDC 
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Platinum).  Private_Targeti is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target is a private firm, 
0 otherwise.  I include Same_Industryi and Private_Targeti because Baik et al. (2007) 
find that stock-for-stock acquirers are more likely to manage earnings when the target is a 
private firm, or when the acquirer and the target are in different industries.  Post_SOXi is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 for fiscal quarters ending after 2001, 0 otherwise.  I control 
for Post_SOXi since recent studies find an increasing trend of firms to use real earnings 
management as a substitute to accruals management after the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2002 (Cohen et al. 2008; Graham et al. 2005; Jiang et al. 2008). 
Test of Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the association between pre-acquisition abnormal 
accruals and abnormal stock returns around the acquisition announcement is negative for 
stock-for-stock acquirers with high disclosure costs and non-negative for stock-for-stock 
acquirers with low disclosure costs.  I test this hypothesis by estimating the following 
OLS regression: 
CARi = φ1 + φ2Cum_AAi + φ3High_Costi*Cum_AAi + φ4High_Costi + φ5Pooli  
+ φ6Private_Targeti + φ7Same_Industryi + φ8MVi + φ9Rev_Sizei +  ηi            (3) 
CARi is the cumulative abnormal return to the stock of acquirer i over trading 
days [-1, +1] (CAR[-1,+1]) or trading days [-21, +1] (CAR[-21,+1]).  Trading days are defined 
relative to the acquisition announcement date (day 0).  Abnormal returns are estimated 
using a market model with betas estimated using daily returns from the 22nd trading day 
through the 274th trading day prior to the acquisition announcement.20  Acquirers with 
less than 60 trading days available to estimate the market model are excluded.  The 
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 The specific model is: Rit = αi + βi*Rmt + εit.  Rit is the return for firm i for day t.  Rmt is the market return 
for day t. 
26 
 
market return is proxied for by the CRSP value weighted index.  While CAR[-1, +1] is 
typically used to measure the market’s reaction to news, Louis (2004) notes that 
information about mergers and acquisitions might be leaked to the market well before the 
official announcement due to lengthy negotiation processes.  Therefore, following Louis 
(2004), I also use CAR[-21,+1] as a proxy for the market reaction in testing hypothesis 2.  
Cum_AAi is the cumulative performance adjusted abnormal accruals of acquirer i over the 
three quarters immediately before the acquisition announcement.  High_Costi equals 
either High_IndConi, Low_Margini, High_MBi, High_Volatilityi, or High_Segmenti.  
High_IndConi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if acquirer i’s industry concentration is 
above the median industry concentration of all sample acquirers, 0 otherwise.  
Low_Margini is a dummy variable equal to 1 if acquirer i’s price-cost margin is smaller 
than or equal to the median price-cost margin of all sample acquirers, 0 otherwise.  
High_MBi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if acquirer i’s market-to-book ratio is above 
the median market-to-book ratio of all sample acquirers, 0 otherwise.  High_Volatilityi is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if acquirer i’s earnings volatility is above the median 
earnings volatility of all sample acquirers, 0 otherwise.  High_Segmenti is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if acquirer i has at least two business segments, 0 otherwise.  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that φ2
 0, φ3 < 0, and φ2+φ3 < 0. 
Several control variables are included in model (3) based on findings in prior 
studies.  Pooli is a dummy variable equal to 1 if acquirer i uses the pooling-of-interest 
method in accounting for the acquisition, 0 otherwise.  Martínez-Jerez (2008) finds that 
the market reacts more negatively to acquisitions in which the acquirer uses the pooling-
of-interest method relative to acquisitions in which the acquirer uses the purchase 
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method.  Private_Targeti is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target is a private firm, 0 
otherwise.  Prior research documents that the market reacts more favorably to 
acquisitions of private targets relative to acquisitions of public targets (Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz 2004; Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn 2008).  Same_Industryi is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if both the acquirer and its target are in the same industry, 0 
otherwise (industries are defined in terms of the two-digit SIC assigned by SDC 
Platinum).  This variable is included since prior research finds a negative association 
between the extent of diversification and firm value (Lang and Stulz 1994; Berger and 
Ofek 1995; Comment and Jarrell 1995; John and Ofek 1995).  In addition, Scanlon, 
Trifts, and Pettway (1989) find that acquirers’ announcement returns are lower when the 
acquirer and its target are in unrelated industries relative to when the acquirer and its 
target are in related industries.  MVi is the natural logarithm of the market value of 
acquirer i’s equity at the end of the fiscal quarter immediately before the acquisition 
announcement.  Empirically, large acquirers earn lower announcement returns than small 
acquirers (Moeller et al. 2004; Betton et al. 2008).  Rev_Sizei is the target relative size, 
measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the deal value reported by SDC Platinum 
and the market value of acquirer i’s equity at the end of the fiscal quarter immediately 
before the acquisition announcement.  Prior studies find inconsistent results regarding the 
association between targets’ relative size and acquirers’ announcement returns.  For 
example, the association is negative in Scanlon et al. (1989) and positive in Moeller et al. 
(2004).21   
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 I do not control for deal characteristics such as tender offer versus merger or friendly versus hostile 
because the majority of stock-for-stock acquisitions are friendly deals and in the form of a merger.  In my 
specific sample, only two deals are hostile and three deals are tender offer. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for selected acquirer and deal characteristics 
of the primary sample used in this paper.  Based on the median market value of equity 
and total assets, acquirers in my sample are smaller than acquirers in related studies 
(Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004; Baik et al. 2007).  The average market-to-book 
ratio of my sample acquirers is higher than the average Tobin’s Q of sample acquirers in 
Baik et al. (2007).  Compared to targets in Baik et al. (2007), targets in my sample are 
smaller (as reflected by Deal Value), although targets in my sample tend to be larger 
relative to acquirers (as reflected by Relative Size).  About 59% of the deals are between 
firms in the same industry, compared to 71% in Baik et al. (2007).  Table 2 also shows 
some statistics for all stock-for-stock deals from the SDC Platinum database with 
available data for the selected statistics.  Compared to this sample, my sample has similar 
characteristics, except that acquirers in my sample have higher total assets and lower 
market-to-book ratio. This alleviates the concern about the generalizability of the results 
to some extent. 
Consistent with stock-for-stock acquirers inflating earnings in quarters leading to 
the acquisition announcement, both the mean and median cumulative abnormal accruals 
(Cum_AA) are positive and statistically significant (p-value<0.001).  Turning to other 
statistics, target shareholders earn an average premium of around 38%.  Note that 
Premium is the cumulative abnormal return to the target’s stock from the 42nd trading day 
before through the 126th trading day after the acquisition announcement (or through 
delisting, whichever comes first), so the premium incorporates the market discount for 
earnings management when the acquisition is announced.  Consistent with prior research 
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(Moeller et al. 2004; Betton et al. 2008; Louis 2004; and Martínez-Jerez 2008), the 
market appears to react positively to acquisitions of private targets (mean and median 
CAR[-1,+1] are positive and statistically significant) and react negatively to acquisitions of 
public targets (mean and median CAR[-1,+1] are negative and statistically significant). 
Table 3 presents Pearson correlation coefficients among key variables in this 
study.  As expected, acquirers’ pre-acquisition abnormal accruals (Cum_AA) is negatively 
correlated with acquirers’ price-cost margin (PC_Margin) and size (Size), and positively 
correlated with acquirers’ use of pooling-of-interest accounting (Pool), industry 
concentration (IndCon), and earnings volatility (NI_Volatility).  While Cum_AA is 
negatively associated with litigation risk (Litigation) and positively associated with 
market-to-book ratio (MB) and leverage (Leverage) as predicted, the correlation 
coefficients are not statistically significant at the 10-percent level.  CAR[-1,+1] is 
negatively correlated with Cum_AA, but the correlation is not statistically significant at 
the 10-percent level.  This is consistent with Louis’ (2004) argument that because of the 
leakage of information prior to the official acquisition announcement, one might not be 
able to find a significantly negative association between acquirers’ pre-acquisition 
abnormal accruals and CAR[-1,+1].  Finally, there is no statistically significant association 
between acquirers’ pre-acquisition abnormal accruals and acquisition premium. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Acquirer and Deal Characteristics 
 Sample Deals  All SDC Deals 
Variable Obs Mean  Median Obs Mean Median
MVE ($mil) 890 8,472.44 351.47 2,231 6,524.93 432.94 
TA ($mil) 890 1,791.64 168.20 2,260 1,485.33 152.86 
MB 887 4.15 3.12 1,956 5.39 3.65 
Cum_AA 890 1.94*** 0.73*** - - - 
IndCon 884 0.32 0.33 - - - 
PC_Margin 760 0.03 0.04 - - - 
NI_Volatility 875 0.05 0.02 - - - 
Segment 890 2.75 1.00 - - - 
Debt/Asset 890 0.13 0.04 2,226 0.19 0.03 
Pool 890 0.41 0.00 2,269 0.45 0.00 
Litigation 890 0.52 1.00 - - - 
Same_Industry 890 0.59 1.00 2,269 0.59 1.00 
Private_Target 890 0.57 1.00 2,269 0.63 1.00 
Deal Value ($mil) 890 120.26 36.74 2,269 116.85 37.72 
Relative Size 890 0.62 0.13 1,962 0.69 0.12 
Premium (%) 246 0.38 0.37 - - - 
CAR[-1,+1] 803 0.01 0.00 - - - 
 - Private Target (%) 458 2.60*** 0.58*** - - - 
 - Public Target (%) 345 -1.03** -1.42*** - - - 
    
   
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Variables are measured at the end of the 
quarter immediately before the acquisition announcement, unless otherwise stated.  MVE is the acquirer’s 
market value of equity.  TA is the acquirer’s total assets.  MB is the acquirer’s market value over book value 
of equity at the end of the fourth quarter before the acquisition announcement.  Cum_AA is the acquirer’s 
cumulative abnormal accruals over the three quarters immediately before the acquisition announcement 
(expressed as percentage of lagged total assets).  IndCon is the acquirer’s industry concentration measured 
for the year immediately before the acquisition announcement.  PC_Margin is the average price-cost 
margin of the acquirer over the three years before the acquisition announcement, adjusted for the median 
price-cost margin of the acquirer’s industry over the same period.  NI_Volatility is the standard deviation of 
the acquirer’s net income scaled by lagged total assets, calculated over eight quarters up to the fourth 
quarter before the acquisition announcement.  Segment is the acquirer’s number of business segments.  
Debt/Asset is the acquirer’s long-term debt over total assets.  Pool is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
acquirer uses the pooling-of-interest accounting method, 0 otherwise.  Litigation is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 for acquirers that belong to high-litigation risk industries, 0 otherwise.  High-litigation risk industries 
include biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computers (SIC codes 3570-3577 and 7370-
7374), electronics (SIC codes 3600-3674), and retailing (SIC codes 5200-5961).  Same_Industry is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if both the acquirer and its target are in the same industry, 0 otherwise.  
Private_Target is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target is a private firm, 0 otherwise.  Deal Value is the 
deal value as reported by SDC Platinum.  Relative Size is the ratio of the deal value over the market value 
of the acquirer’s equity.  Premium is the cumulative abnormal return to the target’s stock from the 42nd 
trading day before through the 126th trading day after the acquisition announcement or through delisting, 
whichever comes first.  CAR[-1,+1] is the acquirer’s three-day cumulative abnormal return centered on the 
acquisition announcement date.  Abnormal returns are estimated using a market model.  
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Table 3: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) Cum_AA 1.00               
(2) IndCon 0.07 1.00              
(3) PC_Margin -0.12 -0.02 1.00             
(4) MB 0.01 -0.01 0.06 1.00            
(5) NI_Volatility 0.10 -0.05 -0.40 0.03 1.00           
(6) Segment -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.01 1.00          
(7) Size -0.15 -0.14 0.49 0.05 -0.25 0.16 1.00         
(8) Pool 0.11 -0.07 0.24 -0.03 -0.15 -0.24 0.11 1.00        
(9) Leverage 0.00 0.01 -0.10 -0.04 -0.03 0.13 0.06 -0.15 1.00       
(10) Litigation -0.04 -0.20 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.10 0.04 -0.28 1.00      
(11) Same_Industry -0.02 -0.13 -0.04 -0.05 0.04 -0.10 -0.02 0.08 0.05 0.01 1.00     
(12) Private_Target 0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.08 -0.08 -0.11 0.11 -0.13 0.08 -0.05 1.00    
(13) Rev_Size 0.08 0.10 -0.33 -0.04 0.09 -0.05 -0.66 0.01 0.04 -0.12 0.08 -0.20 1.00   
(14) CAR[-1,+1] -0.03 0.05 -0.07 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.14 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.18 0.11 1.00  
(15) Premium -0.08 -0.01 -0.10 0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.06 -0.15 -0.10 0.06 0.06 . -0.19 0.13 1.00 
                 
 
Bold text indicates statistical significance at the 10-percent level or lower.  Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of the acquirer’s equity at 
the end of the fourth quarter prior to the acquisition announcement.  Leverage is the acquirer’s long-term debt divided by total assets at the end of the 
fourth quarter prior to the acquisition announcement.  Rev_Size is the target relative size, measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the deal value 
and the market value of the acquirer’s equity at the end of the fiscal quarter immediately prior to the acquisition announcement.  All other variables are 
defined as in Table 2.  
32 
 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Preliminary Evidence of Earnings Management by Stock-for-Stock Acquirers 
Figure 1 plots mean and median quarterly abnormal accruals from eight quarters 
before through two quarters after the acquisition announcement for 1,388 stock-for-stock 
acquirers with available abnormal accruals data.  The graph shows that there is a “jump” 
in abnormal accruals over the three quarters immediately before the acquisition 
announcement.  In untabulated tests, I find that both mean and median abnormal accruals 
are statistically significant at conventional levels for each of the three quarters 
immediately before the acquisition announcement (p-value is smaller than 5% for quarter 
-3 and smaller than 1% for quarter -2 and -1).  Thus, consistent with prior studies, I find 
that, on average, stock-for-stock acquirers inflate earnings as early as three quarters prior 
to the acquisition announcement (Erickson and Wang 1999; Baik et al. 2007). 
Figures 2 through 6 plots median abnormal accruals of acquirers with high- and 
low-disclosure costs as proxied for by industry concentration, price-cost margin, market-
to-book ratio, earnings volatility, and number of business segments, respectively.  It is 
clear from figures 2 and 3 that there is a larger “jump” in abnormal accruals over the 
three quarters immediately before the acquisition announcement for acquirers with high 
disclosure costs relative to acquirers with low disclosure costs (recall that high industry 
concentration implies high disclosure costs while high price-cost margin implies low 
disclosure costs).  Nonparametric tests suggest that differences in median abnormal 
accruals between acquirers with high- and low-disclosure costs are statistically significant 
at the 5-percent level or lower for quarters -3 and -2.  In figure 4, there is some evidence 
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that acquirers with high market-to-book ratio have higher abnormal accruals than 
acquirers with low market-to-book ratio over the three quarters immediately before the 
acquisition announcement.  However, the difference in abnormal accruals is only 
statistically significant at the 5-percent level for quarter -3.  Overall, this evidence 
suggests that there is a positive association between acquirers’ proprietary disclosure 
costs and abnormal accruals over the three quarters immediately before the acquisition 
announcement, consistent with my first hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Abnormal accruals of stock-for-stock acquirers.  Quarter -1 is the 
latest quarter with the earnings announcement date preceding the acquisition 
announcement date.  Quarter –k is the kth quarter preceding the acquisition announcement 
date.  Quarter 0 (1) is the first (second) quarter with the earnings announcement date after 
the acquisition announcement date.  Abnormal accruals are estimated using the method in 
Kothari et al. (2005).  The sample includes 1,388 stock-for-stock deals with data 
available.  
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Figure 2: Abnormal accruals of stock-for-stock acquirers with high industry 
concentration (High_IndCon) and low industry concentration (Low_IndCon).  
High_IndCon and Low_Indcon are defined relative to the median industry concentration 
of sample acquirers.  Quarter orders are defined as in Figure 1.  The sample includes 
1,388 stock-for-stock deals with data available. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Abnormal accruals of stock-for-stock acquirers with high price-
cost margin (High_Margin) and low price-cost margin (Low_Margin).  High_Margin 
and Low_Margin are defined relative to the median price-cost margin of sample 
acquirers.  Quarter orders are defined as in Figure 1.  The sample includes 1,109 stock-
for-stock deals with data available. 
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Figure 4: Abnormal accruals of stock-for-stock acquirers with high market-
to-book (High_MB) and low market-to-book (Low_MB).  High_MB and Low_MB 
are defined relative to the median market-to-book ratio of sample acquirers.  Quarter 
orders are defined as in Figure 1.  The sample includes 1,385 stock-for-stock deals with 
data available. 
 
 
In figure 5, acquirers with high earnings volatility (which have high disclosure 
costs) have higher abnormal accruals than acquirers with low earnings volatility over the 
three quarters immediately before the acquisition announcement.  However, the 
difference in abnormal accruals is only statistically significant at the 10-percent level for 
quarter -3.  Finally, figure 6 shows that there is no significant difference in abnormal 
accruals between acquirers with multiple business segments (Diversified) and acquirers 
with a single business segment (Undiversified).  Thus, there is no evidence that firms that 
have multiple business segments are more likely to manage earnings before the 
acquisition than firms that have a single business segment. 
 
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
M
e
di
a
n
 
a
bn
o
rm
a
l a
cc
ru
a
ls
 
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1
  
Quarter relative to merger announcement
High_MB
Low_MB
36 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Abnormal accruals of stock-for-stock acquirers with high earnings 
volatility (High_Volatility) and low earnings volatility (Low_Volatility).  
High_Volatility and Low_Volatility are defined relative to the median earnings volatility 
of sample acquirers.  Quarter orders are defined as in Figure 1.  The sample includes 
1,180 stock-for-stock deals with data available. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Abnormal accruals of stock-for-stock acquirers with multiple 
business segments (Diversified) and a single business segment (Undiversified).  
Quarter orders are defined as in Figure 1.  The sample includes 1,384 stock-for-stock 
deals with data available. 
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Acquirers’ Disclosure Costs and Pre-acquisition Abnormal Accruals 
Table 4 presents regression results for model (2) when Disc_Costi is either 
industry concentration, price-cost margin, or market-to-book ratio (three proxies for 
proprietary disclosure costs).  Columns (1), (3) and (5) show results when continuous 
measures of disclosure costs (IndConi, PC_Margini, and MBi) are used, while columns 
(2), (4) and (6) show results when binary measures of disclosure costs (High_IndConi, 
High_Margini, and High_MBi) are used.  Consistent with hypothesis 1, the coefficient on 
Disc_Costi is negative and statistically significant at the 5-percent level or lower when 
price-cost margin is used as a proxy for disclosure costs, and the coefficient on 
Disc_Costi is positive and statistically significant at the 10-percent level or lower when 
industry concentration and market-to-book ratio are used as proxies of disclosure costs.  
The result does not depend on whether continuous or binary measures of disclosure costs 
are used.  The difference in cumulative abnormal accruals between acquirers with high 
disclosure costs and acquirers with low disclosure costs is 1.01% of lagged total assets 
when High_IndConi is used, 2.15% of lagged total assets when High_Margini is used, 
and 2.79% of lagged total assets when High_MBi is used as a proxy for disclosure costs.  
Overall, the results in Table 4 are consistent with hypothesis 1, which predicts a positive 
association between stock-for-stock acquirers’ proprietary disclosure costs and pre-
acquisition abnormal accruals. 
Results for control variables are generally as predicted.  Larger firms tend to have 
lower abnormal accruals, consistent with the political cost hypothesis (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986).  Firms that use the pooling-of-interest method appear to inflate 
earnings more than firms that use the purchase method, presumably because the former 
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have stronger incentives to report favorable financial performance (Aboody et al. 2000; 
Ayers et al. 2002).  Consistent with the concern about debt covenant violation, firms with 
higher leverage tend to have higher abnormal accruals, although the coefficient is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  Inconsistent with prior studies (Graham et 
al. 2005; Cohen et al. 2008; Jiang et al. 2008), I do not find evidence that acquirers’ pre-
acquisition abnormal accruals are lower after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002.  Other control variables are statistically insignificant at conventional levels. 
Table 5 presents regression results for model (2) when Disc_Costi is either 
acquirers’ earnings volatility (NI_Volatility) or number of business segments (Segment), 
two proxies for the difficulty faced by acquirers in providing sufficient information to 
signal the absence of earnings management (i.e., disclosure complexity).  Although the 
coefficient on Disc_Costi is positive when earnings volatility is used, the coefficient is 
not statistically significant at conventional levels.  When the number of business 
segments is used, the coefficient is also not statistically distinguishable from zero.  Thus, 
I do not find evidence that acquirers with higher disclosure complexity are more likely to 
manage earnings before the acquisition announcement.  
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Table 4: Acquirers’ Abnormal Accruals and Proprietary Disclosure Costs 
Cum_AAi = θ1 + θ2Disc_Costi + θ3Sizei + θ4Pooli + θ5Leveragei + θ6Litigationi  
+ θ7Same_Industryi + θ8Private_Targeti + θ9Post_SOXi  + εi   
 Industry Concentration  Price-Cost Margin  Market-to-Book Ratio 
 Continuous Binary  Continuous Binary  Continuous Binary 
Disc_Cost 4.325* 1.009*  -4.283** -2.150***  0.209** 2.792*** 
 (1.72) (1.67)  (2.18) (3.10)  (2.42) (4.04) 
Size -0.599*** -0.598***  -0.388** -0.372**  -0.769*** -0.827*** 
 (4.19) (4.15)  (2.41) (2.41)  (5.00) (5.56) 
Pool 2.757*** 2.673***  2.921*** 2.900***  2.611*** 2.430*** 
 (4.25) (4.14)  (4.11) (4.14)  (4.11) (3.86) 
Leverage 1.608 1.508  0.586 0.547  1.651 2.252 
 (0.85) (0.80)  (0.31) (0.29)  (0.81) (1.11) 
Litigation -0.207 -0.251  -0.572 -0.596  -0.606 -0.749 
 (0.31) (0.38)  (0.84) (0.87)  (0.92) (1.15) 
Same_Industry -0.68 -0.69  -0.556 -0.563  -0.835 -0.914 
 (1.07) (1.08)  (0.81) (0.82)  (1.37) (1.51) 
Private_Target 0.62 0.574  0.962 0.811  0.148 0.071 
 (1.04) (0.97)  (1.47) (1.25)  (0.25) (0.12) 
Post_SOX 1.155 1.182  1.172 1.214  1.36 1.496* 
 (1.27) (1.30)  (1.14) (1.20)  (1.59) (1.77) 
Constant 2.503 3.492***  2.915** 3.900***  4.506*** 4.534*** 
 (1.55) (2.61)  (2.28) (3.15)  (3.78) (3.82) 
Observations 884 884  760 760  866 866 
R-squared 0.05 0.05  0.05 0.05  0.05 0.07 
        
 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Disc_Costi is proxied for by IndConi, PC_Margini, and MBi (continuous measures), or High_IndConi, 
High_Margini, and High_MBi (binary measures).  See Appendix B for the definition of these proxies and 
other variables in the model.  Cum_AAi, IndConi, PC_Margini are truncated at the 0.5th and 99.5th 
percentiles.  MBi is truncated at 0 and the 99.5th percentile. 
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Table 5: Acquirers’ Abnormal Accruals and Disclosure Complexity 
Cum_AAi = θ1 + θ2Disc_Costi + θ3Sizei + θ4Pooli + θ5Leveragei + θ6Litigationi  
+ θ7Same_Industryi + θ8Private_Targeti + θ9Post_SOXi  + εi   
 NI_Volatility  Segment 
 Continuous Binary  Continuous Binary 
Disc_Cost 8.966 0.292  -0.007 -0.426 
 (1.58) (0.49)  (0.07) (0.61) 
Size -0.536*** -0.599***  -0.626*** -0.611*** 
 (3.80) (4.39)  (4.41) (4.26) 
Pool 3.110*** 2.941***  2.779*** 2.695*** 
 (4.56) (4.40)  (4.19) (4.06) 
Leverage 1.454 1.538  1.3 1.383 
 (0.79) (0.83)  (0.66) (0.71) 
Litigation -0.774 -0.575  -0.449 -0.466 
 (1.12) (0.84)  (0.67) (0.69) 
Same_Industry -0.571 -0.51  -0.641 -0.662 
 (0.91) (0.80)  (0.99) (1.03) 
Private_Target 0.561 0.65  0.542 0.536 
 (0.91) (1.07)  (0.89) (0.88) 
Post_SOX 1.589* 1.632*  1.272 1.462 
 (1.81) (1.86)  (1.32) (1.48) 
Constant 3.240*** 3.774***  4.284*** 4.401*** 
 (2.61) (3.09)  (3.48) (3.58) 
Observations 875 875  890 890 
R-squared 0.05 0.05  0.05 0.05 
      
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Variable definitions: Disc_Costi is proxied for by NI_Volatilityi and Segmenti (continuous measures), or 
High_Volitilityi and High_Segmenti (binary measures).  See Appendix B for the definition of these proxies 
and other variables in the model.  Cum_AAi and NI_Volatilityi are truncated at the 0.5th and 99.5th 
percentiles. 
 
 
Acquirers’ Pre-acquisition Abnormal Accruals and Stock Returns Around 
Acquisition Announcements 
Table 6 presents regression results for model (3) when Disc_Costi is either 
industry concentration (High_IndConi), price-cost margin (Low_Margini), or market-to-
book ratio (High_MBi).  Consistent with hypothesis 2, the sum of the coefficients on 
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Cum_AAi and High_Costi*Cum_AAi (i.e., φ2+φ3) is negative and statistically significant 
at the 10-percent level or lower for two measures of cumulative abnormal return (CAR[-
1,+1] and CAR[-21,+1]) and three measures of proprietary disclosure costs (High_IndConi, 
Low_Margini, and High_MBi).  This result suggests that upon the acquisition 
announcement, the market discounts pre-acquisition abnormal accruals of acquirers with 
high proprietary disclosure costs.  Although the coefficient on the interaction term 
between High_Costi and Cum_AAi (φ3) is negative as predicted by hypothesis 2, the 
coefficient is in general not statistically significant at conventional levels.  Finally, the 
coefficient on Cum_AAi (φ2) is statistically indistinguishable from zero at conventional 
levels for both measures of abnormal returns.  Thus, the market does not appear to 
discount pre-acquisition abnormal accruals of stock-for-stock acquirers with low 
proprietary disclosure costs, also consistent with hypothesis 2.  Overall, the results in 
Table 6 are consistent with hypothesis 2, which predicts that the association between pre-
acquisition abnormal accruals and abnormal stock returns around the acquisition 
announcement is negative for stock-for-stock acquirers with high disclosure costs but not 
for stock-for-stock acquirers with low disclosure costs. 
With regard to the control variables, the coefficient on Pooli is negative and in 
general statistically significant at conventional levels, consistent with the finding in 
Martínez-Jerez (2008) that the market reacts less favorably to acquisitions in which the 
acquirer uses the pooling-of-interest accounting method.  Consistent with prior studies 
(Moeller et al. 2004; Betton et al. 2008), acquirers earn higher abnormal announcement 
returns when the target is a private firm (the coefficient on Private_Targeti is positive) or 
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when the target is larger relative to the acquirer (the coefficient on Rev_Sizei is positive).  
Other control variables are not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Table 7 presents regression results for model (3) when Disc_Costi is either 
earnings volatility (High_Volatilityi) or number of business segments (High_Segmenti).  
Consistent with Table 5, but inconsistent with hypothesis 2, the sum of the coefficients on 
Cum_AAi and High_Costi*Cum_AAi (i.e., φ2+φ3) is in general not statistically 
significant at conventional levels.  The coefficient on the interaction term (φ3) is also not 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  Thus, the market does not appear to react 
differently to pre-acquisition abnormal accruals of acquirers with different levels of 
disclosure complexity. 
Together, the results in Table 4 and Table 6 are consistent with acquirers with 
higher proprietary costs have higher pre-acquisition abnormal accruals.  When the 
acquisition is announced, the market discounts pre-acquisition abnormal accruals of 
acquirers with high proprietary disclosure costs but does not discount abnormal accruals 
of acquirers with low proprietary disclosure costs.  I interpret these results as suggesting 
that acquirers with high disclosure costs are more likely to manage earnings before the 
acquisition than acquirers with low disclosure costs. 
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Table 6: Acquirers’ Abnormal Accruals and Stock Returns Around Acquisition 
Announcements Conditional on Proprietary Disclosure Costs 
CARi = φ1 + φ2Cum_AAi + φ3High_Costi*Cum_AAi + φ4High_Costi + φ5Pooli  
            + φ6Private_Targeti + φ7Same_Industryi + φ8MVi + φ9Rev_Sizei +  ηi  
 High_IndCon  Low_Margin  High_MB 
 CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-21,+1]  CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-21,+1]  CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-21,+1] 
Cum_AA -0.036 -0.14  0.012 -0.115  0.034 -0.191 
 (0.57) (1.27)  (0.22) (0.94)  (0.48) (1.40) 
High_Cost*Cum_AA -0.089 -0.308*  -0.115 -0.256  -0.121 -0.078 
 (1.04) (1.94)  (1.41) (1.54)  (1.46) (0.47) 
High_Cost 0.013* 0.004  0.005 0.016  -0.005 0.006 
 (1.70) (0.31)  (0.52) (0.98)  (0.71) (0.35) 
Pool -0.011 -0.021  -0.011 -0.033**  -0.012* -0.026* 
 (1.55) (1.52)  (1.51) (2.17)  (1.66) (1.84) 
Private_Target 0.047*** 0.071***  0.051*** 0.076***  0.045*** 0.068*** 
 (5.89) (4.73)  (6.03) (4.62)  (5.47) (4.40) 
Same_Industry -0.002 -0.005  -0.002 0.001  -0.003 0.001 
 (0.31) (0.33)  (0.32) (0.09)  (0.47) (0.09) 
MV -0.002 0  -0.001 0.002  -0.001 0 
 (0.68) (0.04)  (0.47) (0.52)  (0.41) (0.05) 
Rev_Size 0.009*** 0.027***  0.011*** 0.029***  0.009** 0.027*** 
 (2.73) (4.90)  (3.22) (4.92)  (2.58) (4.68) 
Constant 0.015 0.062**  0.022 0.050*  0.022 0.057** 
 (0.95) (2.17)  (1.25) (1.66)  (1.57) (2.19) 
φ2+ φ3 -0.125** -0.448***  -0.103* -0.371***  -0.087* -0.269*** 
 (2.05)  (3.73)  (1.65)  (3.15)   (1.81) (2.60) 
Observations 797 797  698 698  784 784 
R-squared 0.08 0.09  0.09 0.11  0.07 0.08 
         
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  CARi is 
either CAR[-1,+1] or CAR[-21,+1].  High_Costi equals either High_IndConi, Low_Margini, or High_MBi.  See 
Appendix B for the definition of these proxies and other variables in this model.  Cum_AAi and CARi are 
truncated at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentiles.   
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Table 7: Acquirers’ Abnormal Accruals and Stock Returns Around Acquisition 
Announcements Conditional on Disclosure Complexity 
CARi = φ1 + φ2Cum_AAi + φ3High_Costi*Cum_AAi + φ4High_Costi + φ5Pooli  
            + φ6Private_Targeti + φ7Same_Industryi + φ8MVi + φ9Rev_Sizei +  ηi  
 High_Volatility  High_Segment 
 CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-21,+1]  CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-21,+1] 
Cum_AA -0.058 -0.272**  -0.053 -0.274*** 
 (1.07) (2.33)  (1.06) (2.69) 
High_Cost*Cum_AA -0.01 0.025  -0.024 0.052 
 (0.14) (0.16)  (0.25) (0.31) 
High_Cost 0 -0.001  -0.006 0.013 
 (0.03) (0.08)  (0.77) (0.82) 
Pool -0.014* -0.025*  -0.015** -0.018 
 (1.95) (1.78)  (2.08) (1.16) 
Private_Target 0.047*** 0.071***  0.047*** 0.071*** 
 (5.73) (4.71)  (5.66) (4.71) 
Same_Industry -0.005 -0.002  -0.002 0.001 
 (0.65) (0.12)  (0.33) (0.05) 
MV -0.002 0  -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.82) (0.07)  (0.94) (0.26) 
Rev_Size 0.010*** 0.027***  0.009*** 0.026*** 
 (3.12) (4.90)  (2.89) (4.68) 
Constant 0.031** 0.066**  0.030** 0.055** 
 (1.98) (2.46)  (2.04) (2.09) 
φ2+ φ3 -0.068 -0.247**  -0.077 -0.222 
 (1.20) (2.30)  (0.95) (1.61) 
Observations 794 794  803 803 
R-squared 0.08 0.09  0.08 0.09 
  
    
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
High_Costi equals either High_Volatilityi or High_Segmenti.  See Appendix B for the definition of these 
proxies and other variables in the model. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ADDITIONAL TESTS 
Acquirers’ Earnings Management and Acquisition Premium 
The underlying premise in this dissertation is that acquirers’ earnings inflation is 
not intended to extract wealth from target shareholders but instead is a rational response 
to targets’ expectations.  If this premise is true, then acquirers’ earnings inflation should 
not be negatively associated with the acquisition premium received by target shareholders 
(i.e., acquirers that manage earnings do not pay lower premium than acquirers that do not 
manage earnings, all else equal).  In contrast, if acquirers use earnings inflation to extract 
wealth from target shareholders and target managers fail to adjust for the earnings 
inflation, then we should observe a negative association between the extent of acquirers’ 
earnings inflation and the acquisition premium received by target shareholders.  To 
provide evidence that acquirers’ earnings inflation does not serve to extract wealth from 
target shareholders, I examine the association between acquirers’ pre-acquisition 
abnormal accruals and acquisition premium using the following OLS regression. 
Premiumi  =  δ1 + δ2Cum_AAi + δ3T_Liquidityi + δ4T_DEi + δ5T_MBi + δ6T_Sizei  
+ δ7T_PEi + δ8T_Sales_Growthi + δ9T_ROEi + δ10T_CFOi  
+ δ11T_Prior_BHARi + δ12Pooli + ηi          (4) 
Following Schwert (1996), I calculate Premiumi as the cumulative abnormal 
return to the target’s stock from the 42nd trading day before through the 126th trading day 
after the acquisition announcement (or through delisting, whichever comes first).22 
                                                           
22
 A disadvantage of measuring abnormal returns over a long horizon (126 trading days after the acquisition 
announcement) is that stock returns of the target might be affected by events unrelated to the acquisition.  
Therefore, I also measure premium as the cumulative abnormal return to the target’s stock from the 42nd 
46 
 
Premiumi = ∑ 
 	,   
   (5) 
ARit is the abnormal return to the target’s stock for day t, estimated using a market 
model.  The market model is estimated for individual firms over the period from the 43rd 
trading day through the 295th trading day prior to the acquisition announcement.  Firms 
with less than 60 trading days available to estimate the market model are excluded.  The 
market return is proxied for by the CRSP value weighted index.  Cum_AAi is the 
cumulative performance adjusted abnormal accruals of acquirer i over the three quarters 
immediately before the acquisition announcement. 
Following prior studies (e.g., Schwert 2000; Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and 
Zutter 2008; Raman et al. 2008), I control for several target characteristics that may affect 
the acquisition premium.  All control variables are measured at the end of the fiscal 
quarter immediately before the acquisition announcement, unless otherwise stated.  
T_Liquidityi is the ratio of the target’s net liquid assets over total assets [(Current assets – 
Current liabilities)/Total assets].  T_DEi is the target’s debt-to-equity ratio.  T_MBi is the 
target’s market value of equity over book value of equity.  T_Sizei is the natural logarithm 
of the target’s market value of equity.  T_PEi is the target’s price-to-earnings ratio.  
T_Sales_Growthi is the average quarterly sales growth of the target calculated over four 
quarters ending at least 120 days prior to the acquisition announcement.  T_ROEi is the 
average quarterly return on equity of the target calculated over four quarters ending at 
least 120 days prior to the acquisition announcement.  T_CFOi is the average quarterly 
operating cash flows scaled by lagged assets of the target calculated over four quarters 
ending at least 120 days prior to the acquisition announcement.  T_Prior_BHARi is the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
trading day before through the 4th trading day after the acquisition announcement (or through delisting, 
whichever comes first).  The result using this alternative measure of premium is also reported in Table 8. 
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buy-and-hold abnormal return (estimated using a market model) to the target’s stock over 
the 12 months ending on the 43rd trading day prior to the acquisition announcement.  
Pooli is a dummy variable equal to 1 if acquirer i uses the pooling-of-interest method in 
accounting for the acquisition, 0 otherwise. 
Table 8 presents regression results for model (4) using the full sample.23  The 
coefficient on Cum_AAi is positive when CAR[-42.+4] is used and negative when CAR[-
42.+126] is used.  More importantly, the coefficient is statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels for both measures of acquisition premium.  Thus, I do not find that 
acquirers that manage earnings effectively pay lower acquisition premium than acquirers 
that do not manage earnings.  Table 9 present regression results for model (4) separately 
for acquirers with high- and low-disclosure costs (disclosure costs are proxied for by 
industry concentration, price-cost margin, and market-to-book ratio).  Similar to the 
results in Table 8, the coefficient on Cum_AAi for acquirers with high- and low-
disclosure costs are both statistically indistinguishable from zero.  The difference in the 
coefficient on Cum_AAi between acquirers with high- and low-disclosure costs is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  This result is consistent with earnings 
management by stock-for-stock acquirers not serving to extract wealth from target 
shareholders.  For control variables, targets’ size, pre-acquisition sales growth and pre-
acquisition abnormal stock returns are negatively associated with acquisition premium, 
consistent with Schwert (2000) and Bargeron et al. (2008).  Other control variables are 
not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
 
                                                           
23
 The sample in this test includes 246 deals for which I could obtain data from Compustat and CRSP to 
calculate the variables included in model (4). 
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Table 8: Acquirers’ Abnormal Accruals and Acquisition Premium (Overall Sample) 
 Premiumi = δ1 + δ2Cum_AAi + δ3T_Liquidityi + δ4T_DEi + δ5T_MBi + δ6T_Sizei  
       + δ7T_PEi + δ8T_Sales_Growthi + δ9T_ROEi + δ10T_CFOi  
       + δ11T_Prior_BHARi + δ12Pooli + η    
  (1)  (2) 
  T_CAR[-42,+126]  T_CAR[-42,+4] 
Cum_AA  -0.083  0.16 
  (0.23)  (0.57) 
T_Liquidity  -0.077  -0.07 
  (0.52)  (0.79) 
T_DE  0.013  0.002 
  (0.56)  (0.19) 
T_MB  -0.006  -0.002 
  (0.49)  (0.34) 
T_Size  -0.049**  -0.036** 
  (2.06)  (2.10) 
T_PE  0.001  0 
  (0.94)  (0.59) 
T_Sales_Growth  -0.017  -0.053*** 
  (0.80)  (3.78) 
T_ROE  0.027  0.049** 
  (0.77)  (2.36) 
T_CFO  -0.049  0.226 
  (0.08)  (0.63) 
T_Prior_BHAR  -0.498***  -0.259*** 
  (7.52)  (7.17) 
Pool  -0.117*  -0.027 
  (1.79)  (0.57) 
Constant  0.982***  0.716*** 
  (3.61)  (3.63) 
Observations  246  246 
R-squared  0.34  0.22 
     
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Premiumi is either T_CARi[-42,+126] or T_CARi[-42,+4].  See Appendix B for the definition of these proxies and 
other variables in the model.  Cum_AAi and Premiumi are truncated at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentiles.  
T_DEi, T_MBi, T_PEi are truncated at -1,000 and 1,000. 
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Table 9: Acquirers’ Abnormal Accruals and Acquisition Premium (Separate Results for 
Acquirers with High- and Low-Disclosure Costs) 
 Premiumi = δ1 + δ2Cum_AAi + δ3T_Liquidityi + δ4T_DEi + δ5T_MBi + δ6T_Sizei  
       + δ7T_PEi + δ8T_Sales_Growthi + δ9T_ROEi + δ10T_CFOi  
       + δ11T_Prior_BHARi + δ12Pooli + η   
 Industry Concentration  Price-Cost Margin  Market-to-Book 
 Low High  Low High  Low High 
Cum_AA 0.385 -0.174  0.277 -0.243  0.009 -0.214 
 (0.60) (0.36)  (0.64) (0.47)  (0.01) (0.61) 
T_Liquidity -0.045 -0.128  -0.106 -0.157  -0.334 0.101 
 (0.24) (0.56)  (0.36) (0.99)  (1.29) (0.50) 
T_DE 0.059 -0.027  0.048 -0.027  -0.029 0.068* 
 (1.28) (0.96)  (1.61) (1.05)  (1.15) (1.83) 
T_MB -0.043*** 0.015  -0.042* 0.016  0.019 -0.032* 
 (3.03) (1.15)  (1.73) (1.28)  (1.10) (1.78) 
T_Size -0.048 -0.043  -0.049 -0.078***  -0.060* -0.033 
 (1.61) (1.26)  (1.13) (2.85)  (1.78) (1.01) 
T_PE 0.001 0  0 0  0 0.001 
 (1.01) (0.39)  (0.31) (0.24)  (0.32) (1.45) 
T_Sales_Growth -0.003 -0.659*  -0.05 -0.107  -0.527 0.001 
 (0.11) (1.69)  (1.16) (0.34)  (1.46) (0.04) 
T_ROE -0.269 0.016  -0.091 0.206*  0.008 -0.076 
 (0.58) (0.56)  (0.95) (1.86)  (0.14) (0.87) 
T_CFO -0.243 -0.276  -1.654 -0.092  -1.068 0.194 
 (0.29) (0.33)  (1.50) (0.14)  (0.86) (0.31) 
T_Prior_BHAR -0.357*** -0.550***  -0.461*** -0.540***  -0.517*** -0.406*** 
 (3.81) (7.99)  (3.91) (8.80)  (4.81) (4.68) 
Pool 0.051 -0.131  -0.019 -0.173**  -0.05 -0.115 
 (0.48) (1.61)  (0.13) (2.51)  (0.48) (1.26) 
Constant 1.049*** 0.877**  0.987** 1.355***  1.124*** 0.803** 
 (3.13) (2.35)  (2.00) (4.29)  (3.05) (2.14) 
Observations 118 125  109 106  117 126 
R-squared 0.32 0.46  0.36 0.52  0.37 0.37 
         
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  In this 
table, premium is T_CAR[-42,+126].  
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Disclosure Costs and Earnings Management by Cash Acquirers 
To provide further evidence on the premise that stock-for-stock acquirers manage 
earnings because targets expect them to do so (the signal-jamming problem), I examine 
whether the association between disclosure costs and pre-acquisition abnormal accruals 
holds for cash acquirers.  Unlike stock-for-stock acquirers, cash acquirers do not have 
obvious acquisition-induced motives to inflate earnings since cash acquirers pay their 
targets with cash.  Therefore, I do not expect the association between disclosure costs and 
pre-acquisition abnormal accruals to hold for cash acquirers. 
I use the same sample selection criteria as in the main tests (except that the 
payment structure is now pure cash) to collect a sample of cash acquirers.  Figure 7 plots 
mean and median performance adjusted abnormal accruals around the acquisition 
announcement for this sample of cash acquirers.  Figures 8 through 10 plot median 
performance adjusted abnormal accruals for cash acquirers with high- and low-disclosure 
costs as proxied for by industry concentration, price-cost margin, and market-to-book 
ratio, respectively.  As can be seen from these four figures, there is no evidence of 
earnings management by cash acquirers regardless of the extent of disclosure costs.  In 
more formal tests, I estimate models (2) and (3) using this sample of cash acquirers.  
Results (untabulated) suggest that there is no association between cash acquirers’ pre-
acquisition abnormal accruals and disclosure costs.  Moreover, upon the acquisition 
announcement, the market does not discount pre-acquisition abnormal accruals of cash 
acquirers, regardless of the extent of disclosure costs.  The absence of an association 
between disclosure costs and pre-acquisition abnormal accruals for cash acquirers 
provides further support for my hypotheses. 
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Figure 7: Abnormal accruals of cash acquirers.  Quarter orders are defined as 
in Figure 1.  The sample includes 1,100 cash deals. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Abnormal accruals of cash acquirers with high industry 
concentration (High_IndCon) and low industry concentration (Low_IndCon).  
High_IndCon and Low_IndCon are defined relative to the median industry concentration 
of sample acquirers.  Quarter orders are defined as in Figure 1.  The sample includes 
1,098 cash deals. 
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Figure 9: Abnormal accruals of cash acquirers with high price-cost margin 
(High_Margin) and low price-cost margin (Low_Margin).  High_Margin and 
Low_Margin are defined relative to the median price-cost margin of sample acquirers.  
Quarter orders are defined as in Figure 1.  The sample includes 969 cash deals. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Abnormal accruals of cash acquirers with high market-to-book 
ratio (High_MB) and low market-to-book ratio (Low_MB).  High_MB and Low_MB 
are defined relative to the median market-to-book ratio of sample acquirers.  Quarter 
orders are defined as in Figure 1.  The sample includes 1,100 cash deals. 
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An Alternative Measure of Abnormal Accruals 
Pungaliya and Vijh (2009) show that stock-for-stock acquirers have higher sales 
growth than cash acquirers.  The authors suggest an approach to estimate abnormal 
accruals that controls for both ROA and sales growth.  To test if my main results are 
sensitive to measures of abnormal accruals, I follow the approach suggested by Pungaliya 
and Vijh (2009) to estimate ROA and sales growth adjusted abnormal accruals.  First, I 
estimate residual accruals for individual firms using model (1) introduced earlier.  Then, 
for each fiscal quarter I sort firms into ROA quintiles based on ROA for the same quarter 
in the previous year.  I simultaneously sort firms into sales growth terciles.  Sales growth 
is the percentage change in sales from the same quarter in the previous year to the current 
quarter.  For each sample firm, I identify a matched portfolio that includes firms in the 
same two-digit industry, ROA quintile, and sales growth tercile.  I require each matched 
portfolio to have at least 3 observations.  Finally, the ROA and sales growth adjusted 
abnormal accruals of each sample firm is the difference between the firm’s residual 
accruals estimated from model (1) and the median residual accruals of the matched 
portfolio.  I re-estimate models (2) and (3) using this alternative measure of abnormal 
accruals as a proxy for earnings management.  The results (untabulated) are similar to the 
main results reported when price-cost margin and market-to-book ratio are used to proxy 
for disclosure costs and are somewhat weaker when industry concentration is used to 
proxy for disclosure costs. 
Deal Size and Stock-for-Stock Acquirers’ Earnings Management 
 Finally, I examine whether the association between acquirers’ earnings 
management and disclosure costs varies with the size of the deal.  The incentive of 
54 
 
acquirers to manage earnings is likely to be stronger when the deal is larger.  I calculate 
deal size as the deal value obtained from SDC Platinum scaled by the market value of the 
acquirer at the end of the fourth quarter prior to the acquisition announcement.  I then 
split the sample in to two subsamples: One subsample includes deals with size above the 
median and the other subsample includes deals with size equal to or below the median.  I 
rerun model (2) and (3) on these two subsamples and find that the association between 
acquirers’ disclosure costs and earnings management is stronger for the subsample of 
larger deals (results are untabulated).  However, the difference in the strength of the 
association between disclosure costs and earnings management between acquirers with 
high- and low-deal size is not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
Despite extensive evidence of earnings management by acquirers before stock-
for-stock acquisitions in the literature, the underlying motive that leads acquirer managers 
to engage in such activity is not well understood.  Given target managers’ strong 
incentives to detect and adjust for earnings management and their ability to request 
additional information from the acquirer during the due diligence process, it is unlikely 
that acquirers would be able to fool target managers and extract wealth from target 
shareholders through earnings management.  Stein (1989) shows that the inability of 
managers to signal the absence of earnings management leads them to manage earnings 
even when they are unable to mislead outside stakeholders.  Building on Stein’s model, in 
this dissertation I examine whether costs associated with disclosing private information 
hinder acquirers’ ability to credibly signal the absence of earnings management to targets, 
thereby leading acquirers with high disclosure costs to manage earnings before stock-for-
stock acquisitions. 
I find that stock-for-stock acquirers with high proprietary disclosure costs, as 
proxied for by acquirers’ industry concentration, price-cost margin and market-to-book 
ratio, have higher pre-acquisition abnormal accruals than stock-for-stock acquirers with 
low proprietary disclosure costs.  Moreover, upon the acquisition announcement, the 
market discounts pre-acquisition abnormal accruals of stock-for-stock acquirers with high 
proprietary disclosure costs but not pre-acquisition abnormal accruals of stock-for-stock 
acquirers with low proprietary disclosure costs, consistent with acquirers with high 
disclosure costs but not acquirers with low disclosure costs using discretionary accruals 
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to manage earnings prior to the acquisition.  Finally, I do not find a negative association 
between the extent of acquirers’ earnings management and the acquisition premium 
received by target shareholders, suggesting that target managers properly anticipate and 
adjust for acquirers’ earnings management in setting the exchange ratio to protect target 
shareholders.  Overall, the results in this dissertation could be interpreted as suggesting 
that earnings management by acquirers before stock-for-stock acquisitions does not serve 
to extract wealth from target shareholders but rather is a rational response to targets’ 
expectations when high disclosure costs prevent the acquirers from credibly signaling the 
absence of earnings management.  More generally, my findings suggest that high 
disclosure costs could lead firms to manage earnings even in settings where they are 
unable to mislead financial statement users. 
One important caveat of this study stems from the fact that both disclosure costs 
and earnings management are not directly observable.  Although abnormal accruals have 
been widely used in the literature to proxy for earnings management, there is little 
consensus on which model provides the best estimate of abnormal accruals.  In addition, 
the proxies for disclosure costs used in this paper (industry concentration, price-cost 
margin, and market-to-book ratio) are likely measured with error.  For example, because 
Compustat does not provide sales data for private firms, the four-firm concentration ratio 
calculated using Compustat data might not accurately capture the true degree of 
concentrations in each industry (Ali, Klasa, Yeung 2009).  Nonetheless, the fact that I 
find consistent results using different measures of proprietary disclosure costs and 
abnormal accruals suggests that my measures capture, at least in part, the underlying 
constructs that they purport to capture.  
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APPENDIX A 
THE EARNINGS MANAGEMENT GAME BEFORE A STOCK-FOR-STOCK ACQUISITION 
Timeline of the Game 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T=2 
Acquisition 
Agreement 
Hypothesis 1: Acquirer’s 
earnings inflation decision 
(association between disclosure 
costs and abnormal accruals) Hypothesis 2: Market’s reaction to 
acquirers’ earnings inflation (association 
between announcement abnormal returns 
and abnormal accruals) 
T=4 
Acquisition 
Completion 
T=3 
Acquisition 
Announcement 
Acquisition 
Initiation & 
Negotiation 
T=1 
Earnings 
Announcement 
T=0 
Earnings 
Realization 
Three players: 
• Acquirer knows true earnings, 
reported earnings, and the 
acquisition. 
• Target knows reported 
earnings, the acquisition, and 
the market reaction. 
• Market knows reported 
earnings and the acquisition. 
The market also infers and 
adjusts the acquirer’s stock 
price for the impact of earnings 
inflation. 
Three players: 
• Acquirer knows true 
earnings, reported 
earnings, and the 
acquisition ahead 
• Target knows reported 
earnings. 
• Market knows reported 
earnings. 
Three players: 
• Acquirer knows true 
earnings 
• Target does not know 
true earnings 
• Market does not know 
true earnings 
Three players: 
• Acquirer knows true earnings, 
reported earnings, and the 
acquisition. 
• Target knows reported earnings 
and the acquisition (so target 
knows the acquirer’s incentive to 
inflate earnings). Target makes 
adjustments for earnings 
management if necessary 
• Market knows reported earnings.  
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Equilibrium Analysis 
In this game, both the acquirer and the target are rational and know the other 
player is rational.  At T=0, nature moves first and determines the acquirer’s earnings 
(high or low).  The acquirer decides whether to manage earnings at time T=1.  
Simultaneously with the decision whether to manage earnings, the acquirer also chooses 
whether to disclose information to signal the absence of earnings management.  After the 
earnings announcement at T=1, the acquirer initiates and negotiates the acquisition with 
the target.24  At time T=2, after observing reported earnings and disclosures by the 
acquirer, the target decides whether to discount the acquirer’s stock price for the effect of 
earnings management (note that at time T=2 the target already knows about the 
acquisition and hence knows the acquirer’s incentive to inflate earnings). 
Assumptions:  
• T is the target’s share of synergy gains (acquisition premium); A is the acquirer’s 
share of synergy gains; C is the cost of earnings management (e.g., expected litigation 
cost); H is the wealth transfer from the target to the acquirer if the acquirer manages 
earnings but the target incorrectly believes that the acquirer does not manage 
earnings; S is the cost incurred by the acquirer to signal the absence of earnings 
management (i.e., costs associated with disclosing private information to the target).  
H is assumed to be correctly inferred by both the acquirer and the target (in fact, this 
must hold in equilibrium). 
• C < H and S<H.  That is, both the cost of earnings management and the cost of 
signaling the absence of earnings management are assumed to be smaller than the 
potential wealth transfer from the target to the acquirer if the target is fooled by the 
acquirer’s earnings management.  These assumptions are not indispensable and are 
made to insure that the acquirer’s decision to manage earnings depends only on the 
relative magnitude of earnings management costs and disclosure costs.  
                                                           
24
 While the assumption that the acquirer is the initiator of the acquisition is not true for every deal, it is a 
reasonable assumption for most acquisitions. 
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With these assumptions, the extensive form of this game is shown below (for ease of presentation, only strategies of the 
acquirer with high realized earnings and associated target’s strategies and payoffs are presented): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
No EM &  
No Signal 
Target 
Target 
Target 
A-C+H 
T-H 
A-C 
T 
Believe  
No EM 
Believe 
EM 
High 
Earnings 
Low 
Earnings 
Acquirer Acquirer 
Nature 
No EM & 
No Signal 
EM & No 
Signal 
No EM & 
Signal 
EM & No 
Signal 
No EM & 
Signal 
Target 
Target 
Believe 
EM 
Believe  
No EM 
Believe  
No EM Believe  
No EM 
Believe 
EM Believe 
EM 
A-H 
T+H 
A 
T 
-S 
0 
A-S 
T 
A-C+H 
T-H 
A-C 
T 
Acquirer 
Target 
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The acquirer with high realized earnings has three strategies: (1) Manage earnings 
and does not signal the absence of earnings management (EM & No Signal); (2) Does 
not manage earnings and signal the absence of earnings management (No EM & 
Signal); (3) Does not manage earnings and does not signal the absence of earnings 
management (No EM & No Signal).25 
The target has four strategies:  
• Strategy 1: Believe the acquirer manages earnings, whether the acquirer signals 
the absence of earnings management or not. 
• Strategy 2: Believe the acquirer manages earnings if the acquirer does not signal 
the absence of earnings management, believe the acquirer does not manage 
earnings if the acquirer signals the absence of earnings management. 
• Strategy 3: Believe the acquirer does not manage earnings if the acquirer does not 
signal the absence of earnings management, believe the acquirer manages 
earnings if the acquirer signals the absence of earnings management. 
• Strategy 4: Believe the acquirer does not manage earnings, whether the acquirer 
signals the absence of earnings management or not. 
It is easy to see that there are two potential Nash equilibria: {EM & No Signal; 
Strategy 2} and {No EM & Signal; Strategy 2}.  Which one will become the Nash 
equilibrium of the game depends on the magnitude of C (cost of earnings 
management) relative to S (cost of signaling the absence of earnings management – 
i.e., disclosure costs). 
• If C > S (cost of earnings management is greater than cost of signaling), then the 
resultant Nash equilibrium is {No EM & Signal; Strategy 2}.  In this equilibrium 
the acquirer does not manage earnings and discloses sufficient information for the 
target to verify the absence of earnings management.  Since the target can verify 
that the acquirer does not manage earnings, the target does not discount the 
acquirer’s stock price in setting the exchange ratio. 
                                                           
25
 Manage earnings & signal the absence of earnings management is a possible but not sensible strategy 
since earnings management will be exposed by the signal. 
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• If C < S (cost of earnings management is smaller than cost of signaling), then the 
resultant Nash equilibrium is {EM & No Signal; Strategy 2}.  In this equilibrium, 
the acquirer manages earnings and refuses to disclose information for the target to 
verify the absence of earnings management.  The target, in turn, assumes that the 
acquirer manages earnings and discounts the acquirer’s stock price in setting the 
exchange ratio. 
  
 62 
 
APPENDIX B 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Variable Definition 
Cum_AAi Cumulative performance adjusted abnormal accruals of acquirer i 
over the three fiscal quarters immediately before the acquisition 
announcement (expressed as percentage of lagged total assets). 
IndConi The degree of concentration of acquirer i’s industry in the year 
immediately before the acquisition announcement. 
High_IndConi A dummy variable equal to 1 if IndConi is above the median 
industry concentration of all sample acquirers, 0 otherwise. 
PC_Margini Acquirer i’s industry adjusted price-cost margin calculated over 
three years up to the year before the acquisition announcement. 
High_Margini A dummy variable equal to 1 if PC_Margini is above the median 
price-cost margin of all sample acquirers, 0 otherwise. 
Low_Margini A dummy variable equal to 1 if High_Margini is zero, 0 otherwise. 
MBi Acquirer i’s market value over book value of equity at the end of 
the fourth quarter before the acquisition announcement. 
High_MBi A dummy variable equal to 1 if MBi is above the median market-
to-book ratio of all sample acquirers, 0 otherwise. 
NI_Volatilityi The standard deviation of quarterly net income scaled by lagged 
total assets of acquirer i calculated over eight quarters up to the 
fourth quarter before the acquisition announcement. 
High_Volatilityi A dummy variable equal to 1 if NI_Volatilityi is above the median 
income volatility of all sample acquirers, 0 otherwise. 
Segmenti Acquirer i’s number of business segments in the year immediately 
before the acquisition announcement. 
High_Segmenti A dummy variable equal to 1 if acquirer i has at least two business 
segments, 0 otherwise. 
Sizei The natural logarithm of the market value of acquirer i’s equity at 
the end of the fourth quarter before the acquisition announcement. 
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Variable Definition 
Pooli A dummy variable equal to 1 if acquirer i uses the pooling-of-
interest method in accounting for the acquisition, 0 otherwise. 
Leveragei Long-term debt divided by total assets of acquirer i at the end of 
the fourth quarter before the acquisition announcement. 
Litigationi A dummy variable equal to 1 if acquirer i operates in a high-
litigation risk industry, 0 otherwise.  High-litigation risk industries 
include biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), 
computers (SIC codes 3570-3577 and 7370-7374), electronics 
(SIC codes 3600-3674), and retailing (SIC codes 5200-5961). 
Same_Industryi A dummy variable equal to 1 if both the acquirer and its target are 
in the same industry, 0 otherwise. 
Private_Targeti A dummy variable equal to 1 if the target is a private firm, 0 
otherwise. 
Post_SOXi A dummy variable equal to 1 for fiscal quarters ending after 2001, 
0 otherwise. 
CAR[-1,+1] Cumulative abnormal return to the stock of acquirer i over trading 
days [-1, +1]. Trading days are defined relative to the acquisition 
announcement (day 0).  Abnormal returns are estimated using a 
market model. 
CAR[-21,+1] Cumulative abnormal return to the stock of acquirer i over trading 
days [-21, +1]. 
MVi The natural logarithm of the market value of acquirer i’s equity at 
the end of the fiscal quarter immediately before the acquisition 
announcement. 
Rev_Sizei The natural logarithm of the ratio of the deal value and the market 
value of acquirer i’s equity at the end of the fiscal quarter 
immediately before the acquisition announcement. 
T_CAR[-42,+126] Cumulative abnormal return to the target’s stock from the 42nd 
trading day before through the 126th trading day after the 
acquisition announcement (or through delisting, whichever comes 
first).  Abnormal returns are estimated using a market model. 
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Variable Definition 
T_CAR[-42,+4] Cumulative abnormal return to the target’s stock from the 42nd 
trading day before through the 4th trading day after the acquisition 
announcement (or through delisting, whichever comes first). 
T_Liquidityi The target’s (current assets – current liabilities)/total assets at the 
end of the quarter immediately before the acquisition 
announcement. 
T_DEi The target’s debt-to-equity ratio at the end of the quarter 
immediately before the acquisition announcement. 
T_MBi The target’s market value over book value of equity at the end of 
the quarter immediately before the acquisition announcement. 
T_Sizei The natural logarithm of the market value of the target’s equity at 
the end of the quarter immediately before the acquisition 
announcement. 
T_PEi The target’s price-to-earnings ratio for the quarter immediately 
before the acquisition announcement. 
T_Sales_Growthi The average quarterly sales growth of the target calculated over 
four quarters ending at least 120 days prior to the acquisition 
announcement date. 
T_ROEi The average quarterly return on equity of the target calculated over 
four quarters ending at least 120 days prior to the acquisition 
announcement date. 
T_CFOi The average quarterly operating cash flows scaled by lagged assets 
of the target calculated over four quarters ending at least 120 days 
prior to the acquisition announcement date. 
T_Prior_BHARi The target’s buy-and-hold abnormal returns (estimated using a 
market model) over the 12 months ending on the 43th trading day 
prior to the acquisition announcement. 
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